If we cannot establish a normatively adequate theory of politics solely on the notion of an approximate equality of strength, the idea of equality will have to be given an irreducible moral content. This introduces the second sense of the idea: namely, equality means that all persons are to be thought of as having the same moral worth and are entitled to equal respect and consideration in the treatment of their interests. Although associated with contemporary liberal political thought, both in its utilitarian and its Kantian variants, this idea has also found a place in many other philosophical and religious traditions, including Jewish and Christian political thought, the Stoic tradition, and the Confucianism associated with Mencius. Currents of thought within Islam, as well as breakaway sects from Hinduism, have also advanced the idea that there is an equal moral worth of all persons. However, can any specific implications about the ordering of social relations be derived from a principle that thinkers of such varying political and philosophical persuasions have endorsed?
One issue here concerns the terms in which we spell out the implications of greater equality. Greater social equality in principle leaves open the question of what exactly is to be equalized: should it be resources, welfare or some other aspect of human life? There are sound arguments for taking any one of these possibilities as the basis of public policy.
However the issue of measurement is resolved, the central justificatory arguments for equality claim that the principle of equal moral worth places limits on what actions a state may pursue (for example, it may not privilege the interests of some at the expense of others), and that a sense of personal worth depends upon the political, social and economic institutions in which members of society participate. Yet, it is easy to see that, although in general this claim may be true, there is no simple way in which the precise nature of these connections can be ascertained.
Suppose it is allowed that people’s sense of self-worth depends upon the social institutions in which they participate, so that poverty and social deprivation will undermine a person’s sense of self-worth. The extent to which this assumption will license a general equalization of social and economic resources is not obvious. Thus, some libertarians have claimed that such equalization will require practices of redistribution that in effect treat the wealthy as mere means to the attainment of some social goal, in a way that is inconsistent with the respect for persons that the principle of equal worth requires (see Libertarianism §3).
In this simple form the libertarian argument does not carry much conviction, since it does not show why requiring persons to fulfil putative obligations under a principle of justice is to treat them merely as means. However, it does at least indicate that there may be constraints on the way in which the practice of redistribution is accomplished and that persons should, by and large, enjoy the fruits of their own labour.
Quite apart from these libertarian objections to the equalization of property, it has also been argued that the principle of equality it should be recognized that there may be a general advantage in some forms of social inequality. Thus, Rawls (1972) has consistently argued that it would be irrational for persons seeking to advance their own interests to prefer a more equal distribution of resources to an unequal distribution of a larger stock that left the poorest persons better off than they would be under the scheme of equality. By this argument the principle of equal moral worth is seen to coexist with permissible inequalities in the allocation of resources or welfare in society.
Further complications stem from the notion of personality itself. It may be argued that the sense of ourselves as persons derives from the special attachments that we form to other persons, or particular places and institutions. Our sense of moral worth depends therefore on subjectively meaningful attachments that limit the extent to which we can take a general impartial concern in the interests of others. For example, if all people are of equal moral worth, it would seem that large-scale international redistribution is called for to realize the principle, but such a proposal could cut across the subjective attachments that persons form within the political communities of which they are members.
The distinctive feature of all three of these sorts of argument is that they do not simply counterpose the principle of equality to other principles of social organization, but seek instead to develop different aspects of that principle to cut the inference from equal moral worth to an equal allocation of rights and goods in society.
In response, one option is to weaken the implications of the principle of equality. For example, perhaps the principle of equal worth does not imply an equalization of rights and goods taken as a whole, but merely that there should be no discrimination in their allocation, so that relative advantages are not unfairly achieved. Similarly, it may be argued that the principle of equality merely requires that persons be given an equal opportunity to acquire unequal social and economic advantages. A particularly influential argument in this mode has been the claim that it is not social and economic inequality in itself that is objectionable, but the accumulation of social and economic inequalities across the different dimensions of social life. Related to this argument is the claim that it may be important to reduce or eliminate only certain social inequalities – in particular those that relate to access to health care or education – in order to be consistent with the principle of equal moral worth.
The most natural way to deal with this variety of interpretations is to allow that one can identify not one but a family of political positions, all of which claim to embody the principle of equal moral worth. The choice between these positions in part depends upon broader issues of social theory (for example, the extent to which one believes that inequalities in different dimensions can be kept separate) and in part depends upon the exercise of judgement (for example, the extent to which one judges that a sense of personal worth depends upon persons being able to retain the fruits of their labour as distinct from enjoying access to collectively shared rights and goods).
There have been a number of challenges to the moral claims of the equality principle. One familiar argument refers to the supposed disincentives to work that would be created by the practice of redistribution from the more productive to the less productive. From one point of view this can be regarded as a pragmatic question, with policy makers having to determine what the balance should be between greater productivity and greater equality. The Rawlsian difference principle, according to which inequalities should be allowed provided they raise the incomes of the least advantaged, can be interpreted here as one possible, but attractive, compromise on this question.
However, the issue of incentives also raises matters of principle, since one way to avoid disincentive effects would be to adopt a scheme of taxation based not on labour but on ability. Although difficult to operate, such a scheme would in principle impose a lump-sum tax (an inherited debt) upon the more able that they would have to work to pay off. Clearly, the problem of work incentives in this case leads straight back to some of the problems of combining equality with a sense of personal attachment that were identified in the previous section.
A second principle that is often set against that of equality is the principle of merit or desert. This principle does provide a direct challenge to equality, since it requires that goods be distributed in proportion to the merits of those receiving them – with the best flute players receiving the best flutes, as Aristotle put it. However, the notion of desert is not without its own problems, and it may be argued that its application only makes sense within the context of an ongoing practice, like an orchestra with its own standards of performance, and not across society as a whole.
The final challenge to the principle of equality has come from the appeal to the notion of difference. Here the argument is that equality implies a uniformity of treatment, whereas interests in society are in fact plural. Thus, instead of basing public decision making on the principle of one person, one vote, a principle of difference would require some groups to be given a special say in certain matters of public policy, for example women a veto over changes to the law on abortion.
The extent to which the appeal to difference mounts a serious challenge to the principle of equality is a matter for dispute, however. Requiring equal consideration of the interests of all persons is compatible with recognizing that over some questions the interests of certain groups are more deeply engaged than others, as can quite easily be seen in the protection of the rights of local communities to take decisions that affect them especially. Thus, to allow that there may be a special say for certain groups in matters of public policy may be compatible with the principle of equality, provided that the acknowledgement of the possibility is not unique to a particular group.
Despite these challenges, therefore, the principle of equality still remains as a central principle of modern political thought. But its very centrality means that continuing discussion over its exact interpretation and implications is likely for a long time to come.
How to cite this article:
WEALE, ALBERT (1998). Equality. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Retrieved September
30, 2003, from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/S021SECT3