United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued November 18, 2002 Decided June 17, 2003 No. 02-5254 & No. 02–5300 CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, ET AL., APPELLANTS/CROSS–APPELLEES v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, APPELLEES/CROSS–APPELLANTS Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 01cv02500) Gregory G. Katsas, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for appellants/cross-appellees. With him on the briefs were Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, Mark B. Stern, Robert M. Loeb, and Eric D. Miller, Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice. Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment. The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out of time. Daniel J. Popeo and Paul D. Kamenar were on the brief for amici curiae Washington Legal Foundation and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs in support of appellant urging partial reversal. Kate A. Martin argued the cause for appellees/crossappellants. With her on the briefs were David L. Sobel, Elliot M. Mincberg, Arthur B. Spitzer, Steven R. Shapiro, and Lucas Guttentag. Laura R. Handman, Eric N. Lieberman, Henry S. Hoberman, Nathan E. Siegel, Richard M. Schmidt, Jr., Slade R. Metcalf, David E. McCraw, Rene Milam, Bruce W. Sanford and Robert D. Lystad were on the brief for amici curiae The Washington Post Company, et al., in support of appellees/ cross-appellants. Before: SENTELLE, HENDERSON and TATEL, Circuit Judges. Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE. Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge TATEL. SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: Various ‘‘public interest’’ groups (plaintiffs) brought this Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) action against the Department of Justice (DOJ or government) seeking release of information concerning persons detained in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, including: their names, their attorneys, dates of arrest and release, locations of arrest and detention, and reasons for detention. The government objected to release, and asserted numerous exceptions to FOIA requirements in order to justify withholding the information. The parties filed crossmotions for summary judgment. The district court ordered release of the names of the detainees and their attorneys, but held that the government could withhold all other detention information pursuant to FOIA Exemption 7(A), which exempts ‘‘records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes TTT to the extent that the production’’ of them ‘‘could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (2000). Attorneys filed cross-appeals. Upon de novo review, we agree with the district court that the detention information is properly covered by Exemption 7(A); but we further hold that Exemption 7(A) justifies withholding the names of the detainees and their attorneys. We also reject plaintiffs’ alternate theories that the First Amendment and the common law mandate disclosure of the contested information. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case to the district court for the entry of a judgment of dismissal. I. Background A. The Investigation Consistent with the mutual decision of the parties to seek resolution to this controversy on summary judgment, the facts are not in serious dispute. In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush ordered a worldwide investigation into those attacks and into ‘‘threats, conspiracies, and attempts to perpetrate terrorist acts against United States citizens and interests.’’ The Department of Justice, defendant in this action, has been conducting the investigation in conjunction with other federal, state and local agencies. The investigation continues today. In the course of the post-September 11 investigation, the government interviewed over one thousand individuals about whom concern had arisen. The concerns related to some of these individuals were resolved by the interviews, and no further action was taken with respect to them. Other interviews resulted in the interviewees being detained. As relevant here, these detainees fall into three general categories. The first category of detainees consists of individuals who were questioned in the course of the investigation and detained by the INS for violation of the immigration laws (INS detainees). INS detainees were initially questioned because there were ‘‘indications that they might have connections with, or possess information pertaining to, terrorist activity against the United States including particularly the September 11 attacks and/or the individuals or organizations who perpetrated them.’’ Based on the initial questioning, each INS detainee was determined to have violated immigration law; some of the INS detainees were also determined to ‘‘have links to other facets of the investigation.’’ Over 700 individuals were detained on INS charges. As of June 13, 2002, only seventy-four remained in custody. Many have been deported. INS detainees have had access to counsel, and the INS has provided detainees with lists of attorneys willing to represent them, as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(2) (2000). INS detainees have had access to the courts to file habeas corpus petitions. They have also been free to disclose their names to the public. The second category of detainees consists of individuals held on federal criminal charges (criminal detainees). The government asserts that none of these detainees can be eliminated as a source of probative information until after the investigation is completed. According to the most recent information released by the Department of Justice, 134 individuals have been detained on federal criminal charges in the post-September 11 investigation; 99 of these have been found guilty either through pleas or trials. While many of the crimes bear no direct connection to terrorism, several criminal detainees have been charged with terrorism-related crimes, and many others have been charged with visa or passport forgery, perjury, identification fraud, and illegal possession of weapons. Zacarias Moussaoui, presently on trial for participating in the September 11 attacks, is among those who were detained on criminal charges. The third category consists of persons detained after a judge issued a material witness warrant to secure their testimony before a grand jury, pursuant to the material witness statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000) (material witness detainees). Each material witness detainee was believed to have information material to the events of September 11. The district courts before which these material witnesses have appeared have issued sealing orders that prohibit the government from releasing any information about the proceedings. The government has not revealed how many individuals were detained on material witness warrants. At least two individuals initially held as material witnesses are now being held for alleged terrorist activity. The criminal detainees and material witness detainees are free to retain counsel and have been provided court-appointed counsel if they cannot afford representation, as required by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution. In sum, each of the detainees has had access to counsel, access to the courts, and freedom to contact the press or the public at large. B. The Litigation On October 29, 2001, plaintiffs submitted a FOIA request to the Department of Justice seeking the following information about each detainee: 1) name and citizenship status; 2) location of arrest and place of detention; 3) date of detention/ arrest, date any charges were filed, and the date of release; 4) nature of charges or basis for detention, and the disposition of such charges or basis; 5) names and addresses of lawyers representing any detainees; 6) identities of any courts which have been requested to enter orders sealing any proceedings in connection with any detainees, copies of any such orders, and the legal authorities relied upon by the government in seeking the sealing orders; 7) all policy directives or guidance issued to officials about making public statements or disclosures about these individuals or about the sealing of judicial or immigration proceedings. To support its FOIA request, plaintiffs cited press reports about mistreatment of the detainees, which plaintiffs claimed raised serious questions about ‘‘deprivations of fundamental due process, including imprisonment without probable cause, interference with the right to counsel, and threats of serious bodily injury.’’ In response to plaintiffs’ FOIA request, the government released some information, but withheld much of the information requested. As to INS detainees, the government withheld the detainees’ names, locations of arrest and detention, the dates of release, and the names of lawyers. As to criminal detainees, the government withheld the dates and locations of arrest and detention, the dates of release, and the citizenship status of each detainee. The government withheld all requested information with respect to material witnesses. Although the government has refused to disclose a compre6 hensive list of detainees’ names and other detention information sought by plaintiffs, the government has from time to time publicly revealed names and information of the type sought by plaintiffs regarding a few individual detainees, particularly those found to have some connection to terrorism. On December 5, 2001, plaintiffs filed this action in district court seeking to compel release of the withheld information pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. Plaintiffs also argued that the First Amendment, as interpreted in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) and its progeny, and the common law doctrine of access to public records require the government to disclose the names and detention information of the detainees. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In its motion, the government contended that FOIA Exemptions 7(A), 7(C), and 7(F), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A), (C) & (F), allow the government to withhold the requested documents as to all three categories of detainees. These exemptions permit withholding information ‘‘compiled for law enforcement purposes’’ whenever disclosure: (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, TTT (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, TTT or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A), (C), (F). As to the material witness detainees, the government also invoked Exemption 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), which exempts from FOIA requirements matters that are ‘‘specifically exempted from disclosure by [other statutes] TTT,’’ contending that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which limits the disclosure of grand jury matters, bars the release of information concerning material witnesses. In support of its motion, the government submitted affidavits from James Reynolds, Director of the Terrorism and Violent Crime Section of the Department of Justice, and Dale 7 Watson, FBI Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism— officials with central responsibility for the ongoing terrorist investigation. See Reynolds Decl., Reynolds Supp. Decl., Reynolds Second Supp. Decl., and Watson Decl. As to Exemption 7(A), the declarations state that release of the requested information could hamper the ongoing investigation by leading to the identification of detainees by terrorist groups, resulting in terrorists either intimidating or cutting off communication with the detainees; by revealing the progress and direction of the ongoing investigation, thus allowing terrorists to impede or evade the investigation; and by enabling terrorists to create false or misleading evidence. As to Exemption 7(C), the declarations assert that the detainees have a substantial privacy interest in their names and detention information because release of this information would associate detainees with the September 11 attacks, thus injuring detainees’ reputations and possibly endangering detainees’ personal safety. Finally, as to Exemption 7(F), the government’s declarations contend that release of the information could endanger the public safety by making terrorist attacks more likely and could endanger the safety of individual detainees by making them more vulnerable to attack from terrorist organizations. For these same reasons, the counterterrorism officials state that the names of the detainees’ lawyers should also be withheld. C. The Judgment On August 2, 2002, the district court rendered its decision, ruling in part for the plaintiffs and in part for the government. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2002) (CNSS). Briefly put, the court ordered the government to disclose the names of the detainees and detainees’ lawyers, but held that the government was entitled to withhold all other detention information under Exemptions 7(A) and 7(F). Id. at 113. Addressing the names of the detainees, the court held that disclosure could not reasonably be expected to interfere with ongoing enforcement proceedings, and thus the names were not exempt under 7(A). The court rejected the government’s argument that disclosure of detainees’ names would deter them from cooperating with the government because terrorist groups likely already know which of their cell members have been detained. Id. at 101. Moreover, the court reasoned that the government’s voluntary disclosure of the names of several detainees undermined the force of its argument about the harms resulting from disclosure. Id. at 101–02. The court further held that ‘‘the government has not met its burden of establishing a ‘rational link’ between the harms alleged and disclosure’’ because its declarations provided no evidence that the detainees actually have any connection to, or knowledge of, terrorist activity. Id. at 102 (quoting Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 789 F.2d 64, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). The court next rejected the government’s 7(A) argument that disclosure of names would allow terrorist groups to map the course of, and thus impede, its investigation. Id. at 103. The government had advanced a ‘‘mosaic’’ argument, contending that the court should consider the aggregate release of the names under 7(A) rather than the release of each in isolation, on the reasoning that the release of the names in toto could assist terrorists in piecing together the course, direction and focus of the investigation. Id. at 103. The district court rejected this argument, holding, inter alia, as a matter of law that FOIA Exemption 7(A) requires an individualized assessment of disclosure, and that the government’s mosaic theory could not justify a blanket exclusion of information under Exemption 7(A). Id. at 103–04. In the district court’s view, the mosaic theory is only cognizable under Exemption 1, which protects information authorized by Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. Id. The court further rejected the government’s final 7(A) argument, concluding that there was insufficient evidence that disclosure would enable terrorist groups to create false and misleading evidence. Id. at 104– 05. Turning to Exemptions 7(C) and 7(F), the court rejected the government’s claims, holding that the admittedly substantial privacy and safety interests of the detainees do not 9 outweigh the vital public interest in ensuring that the government is not abusing its power. Id. at 105–06. The court noted that plaintiffs have raised ‘‘grave concerns’’ about the mistreatment of detainees and have provided evidence of alleged mistreatment in the form of media reports, and firsthand accounts given to Congress and human rights groups. Id. at 105 & n.17. While rejecting the government’s attempt to withhold detainees’ names, the court ruled that it would permit detainees to opt out of disclosure by submitting a signed declaration within fifteen days. Id. at 106. The court did not address the government’s argument that disclosure could harm public safety. Having rejected the government’s Exemption 7 claims, the court further held that Exemption 3 does not bar the release of the names of material witnesses. Id. at 106–07. Specifically, the court held that Exemption 3 does not apply, reasoning Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) does not bar the disclosure of the identities of persons detained as material witnesses, but only bars ‘‘disclosure of a matter occurring before a grand jury.’’ Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(6). The government’s evidence did not establish that any of the detainees were actual grand jury witnesses or were scheduled to testify before a grand jury. Further, the government’s disclosure of the identities of twenty-six material witness detainees undercut its argument that disclosure is barred by statute. 215 F. Supp. 2d at 106–07. As to the government’s contention that court sealing orders prevent the government from releasing the names of material witnesses, the court ordered the government to submit such orders for in camera review or to submit a ‘‘supplemental affidavit explaining the nature and legal basis for these sealing orders.’’ Id. at 108. For reasons not unlike its rejection of the government’s attempt to withhold the names of detainees, the court also held that the government must reveal the names of the detainees’ lawyers.1 The court determined that the names of 1 The government has withheld the names of the attorneys for both INS detainees and material witness detainees; it has revealed the names of the attorneys for the criminally charged detainees. 10 the attorneys were not covered by Exemptions 7(A), 7(C), or 7(F) for the same reason it had rejected the government’s attempt to withhold the names of detainees; because attorneys have no expectation of anonymity; and because any concerns about physical danger were purely speculative. Id. at 109. Turning to the other information sought by plaintiffs—the dates and locations of arrest, detention, and release—the court granted summary judgment for the government on its claim that such detention information was covered under 7(A) and 7(F). Id. at 108. The court credited the counterterrorism officials’ judgment that the detention information ‘‘would be particularly valuable to anyone attempting to discern patterns in the Government’s investigation and strategy,’’ and that disclosure would make detention facilities ‘‘vulnerable to retaliatory attacks.’’ Id. Finally, the court rejected plaintiffs’ claim that the First Amendment and common law entitle them to the dates and locations of arrest, detention, and release. Id. at 111–12. The court ordered the government to release the names of detainees and their lawyers in fifteen days, subject to the right of detainees to opt out of disclosure. Id. at 113–14. On August 15, 2002, the district court stayed its order pending appeal. The government timely appealed. Plaintiffs crossappealed the district court’s ruling that the detention information was properly withheld and the district court’s ruling that detainees could opt out of disclosure. The appeals were consolidated. II. The FOIA Claims We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, Johnson v. Executive Office for United States Attorneys, 310 F.3d 771, 774 (D.C. Cir. 2002), and therefore consider anew each of the claims and defenses advanced before the district court. We turn first to the government’s claims of exemption from disclosure under FOIA of the names of the detainees and their lawyers. 11 A. Names of Detainees ‘‘Public access to government documents’’ is the ‘‘fundamental principle’’ that animates FOIA. John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 151 (1989). ‘‘Congress recognized, however, that public disclosure is not always in the public interest.’’ CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 166–67 (1985). Accordingly, FOIA represents a balance struck by Congress between the public’s right to know and the government’s legitimate interest in keeping certain information confidential. John Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 152. To that end, FOIA mandates disclosure of government records unless the requested information falls within one of nine enumerated exemptions, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). While these exemptions are to be ‘‘narrowly construed,’’ FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 630 (1982), courts must not fail to give them ‘‘a meaningful reach and application,’’ John Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 152. The government bears the burden of proving that the withheld information falls within the exemptions it invokes. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(b). The government invokes four exemptions—7(A), 7(C), 7(F), and 3—to shield the names of detainees from disclosure. Upon review, we hold that Exemption 7(A) was properly invoked to withhold the names of the detainees and their lawyers. Finding the names protected under 7(A), we need not address the other exemptions invoked by the government and reserve judgment on whether they too would support withholding the names. Exemption 7(A) allows an agency to withhold ‘‘records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information TTT could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A). In enacting this exemption, ‘‘Congress recognized that law enforcement agencies had legitimate needs to keep certain records confidential, lest the agencies be hindered in their investigations.’’ NRLB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 232 (1978). Exemption 7(A) does not require a presently pending ‘‘enforcement proceeding.’’ 12 Rather, as the district court correctly noted, it is sufficient that the government’s ongoing September 11 terrorism investigation is likely to lead to such proceedings. See CNSS, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 101 n.9 (citing Bevis v. Dep’t of State, 801 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). The threshold question here is whether the names of detainees were ‘‘compiled for law enforcement purposes.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7). Because the DOJ is an agency ‘‘specializ[ ing] in law enforcement,’’ its claim of a law enforcement purpose is entitled to deference. Campbell v. Dep’t of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Quinon v. FBI, 86 F.3d 1222, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 419 (D.C. Cir. 1982). To establish a law enforcement purpose, DOJ’s declarations must establish (1) ‘‘a rational nexus between the investigation and one of the agency’s law enforcement duties;’’ and (2) ‘‘a connection between an individual or incident and a possible security risk or violation of federal law.’’ Campbell, 164 F.3d at 32 (citations and quotations omitted); see also Quinon, 86 F.3d at 1228. The government’s proffer easily meets this standard. The terrorism investigation is one of DOJ’s chief ‘‘law enforcement duties’’ at this time, see Reynolds Decl. ¶ 2, and the investigation concerns a heinous violation of federal law as well as a breach of this nation’s security. Moreover, the names of the detainees and their connection to the investigation came to the government’s attention as a result of that law enforcement investigation. Reynolds Decl. ¶ ¶ 2–5. Nonetheless, plaintiffs contend that detainees’ names fall outside Exemption 7 because the names are contained in arrest warrants, INS charging documents, and jail records. Since these documents have traditionally been public, plaintiffs contend, Exemption 7 should not be construed to allow withholding of the names. We disagree. Plaintiffs are seeking a comprehensive listing of individuals detained during the post-September 11 investigation. The names have been compiled for the ‘‘law enforcement purpose’’ of successfully prosecuting the terrorism investigation. As compiled, they constitute a comprehensive diagram of the law enforcement 13 investigation after September 11. Clearly this is information compiled for law enforcement purposes. Next, plaintiffs urge that Exemption 7(A) does not apply because disclosure is not ‘‘reasonably likely to interfere with enforcement proceedings.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A). We disagree. Under Exemption 7(A), the government has the burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood of interference with the terrorism investigation. The government’s declarations, viewed in light of the appropriate deference to the executive on issues of national security, satisfy this burden. It is well-established that a court may rely on government affidavits to support the withholding of documents under FOIA exemptions, King v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1987), and that we review the government’s justifications therein de novo, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); Summers v. Dep’t of Justice, 140 F.3d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1998). It is equally well-established that the judiciary owes some measure of deference to the executive in cases implicating national security, a uniquely executive purview. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001) (noting that ‘‘terrorism or other special circumstances’’ might warrant ‘‘heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches’’); Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (‘‘courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the executive in military and national security affairs’’). Indeed, both the Supreme Court and this Court have expressly recognized the propriety of deference to the executive in the context of FOIA claims which implicate national security. In CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985), the Supreme Court examined the CIA’s claims that the names and institutional affiliations of certain researchers in a government-sponsored behavior modification program were exempt from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). Id. at 163– 64. The agency claimed that the information was protected from disclosure by a statute charging the CIA to prevent unauthorized disclosure of ‘‘intelligence sources and meth14 ods,’’ 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3). In accepting the CIA Director’s judgment that disclosure would reveal intelligence sources and methods, the Court explained that ‘‘[t]he decisions of the Director, who must of course be familiar with ‘the whole picture,’ as judges are not, are worthy of great deference given the magnitude of the national security interests and potential risks at stake.’’ Sims, 471 U.S. at 179. The Court further held that ‘‘it is the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence, not that of the judiciary, to weigh the variety of subtle and complex factors in determining whether disclosure of information may lead to an unacceptable risk of compromising the Agency’s intelligence-gathering process.’’ Id. at 180. The same is true of the Justice Department officials in charge of the present investigation. We have consistently reiterated the principle of deference to the executive in the FOIA context when national security concerns are implicated. In McGehee v. Casey, we examined the standard of review for FOIA requests of classified documents. 718 F.2d 1137, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1983). We observed: [C]ourts are to ‘‘accord substantial weight to an agency’s affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of the disputed record’’ because ‘‘the Executive departments responsible for national defense and foreign policy matters have unique insights into what adverse affects [sic] might occur as a result of a particular classified record.’’ Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12, U.S.C.C.A.N. 1974, p. 6267 (1974) (Conference Report on the FOIA Amendments)). Moreover, in the FOIA context, we have consistently deferred to executive affidavits predicting harm to the national security, and have found it unwise to undertake searching judicial review. See, e.g., King, 830 F.2d at 217 (‘‘the court owes substantial weight to detailed agency explanations in the national security context’’); Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (‘‘Once satisfied that proper procedures have been followed and that the information logically falls into the exemption claimed, the 15 courts need not go further to test the expertise of the agency, or to question its veracity when nothing appears to raise the issue of good faith.’’); Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Weissman v. CIA, 565 F.2d 692, 697–98 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Given this weight of authority counseling deference in national security matters, we owe deference to the government’s judgments contained in its affidavits. Just as we have deferred to the executive when it invokes FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3, we owe the same deference under Exemption 7(A) in appropriate cases, such as this one. Id. Plaintiffs provide no valid reason why the general principle of deference to the executive on national security issues should apply under FOIA Exemption 3, as in Sims and Halperin, and Exemption 1, as in our earlier cases, but not under Exemption 7(A). Nor can we can conceive of any reason to limit deference to the executive in its area of expertise to certain FOIA exemptions so long as the government’s declarations raise legitimate concerns that disclosure would impair national security. The need for deference in this case is just as strong as in earlier cases. America faces an enemy just as real as its former Cold War foes, with capabilities beyond the capacity of the judiciary to explore. Exemption 7(A) explicitly requires a predictive judgment of the harm that will result from disclosure of information, permitting withholding when it ‘‘could reasonably be expected’’ that the harm will result. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A). It is abundantly clear that the government’s top counterterrorism officials are well-suited to make this predictive judgment. Conversely, the judiciary is in an extremely poor position to second-guess the executive’s judgment in this area of national security. Cf. Krikorian v. Dep’t of State, 984 F.2d 461, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting Halperin, 629 F.2d at 148) (‘‘Judges TTT lack the expertise necessary to second-guess such agency opinions in the typical national security FOIA case.’’). We therefore reject any attempt to artificially limit the long-recognized deference to the executive on national security issues. Judicial deference depends on the substance of the danger posed by disclosure—that is, 16 harm to the national security—not the FOIA exemption invoked. In light of the deference mandated by the separation of powers and Supreme Court precedent, we hold that the government’s expectation that disclosure of the detainees’ names would enable al Qaeda or other terrorist groups to map the course of the investigation and thus develop the means to impede it is reasonable. A complete list of names informing terrorists of every suspect detained by the government at any point during the September 11 investigation would give terrorist organizations a composite picture of the government investigation, and since these organizations would generally know the activities and locations of its members on or about September 11, disclosure would inform terrorists of both the substantive and geographic focus of the investigation. Moreover, disclosure would inform terrorists which of their members were compromised by the investigation, and which were not. This information could allow terrorists to better evade the ongoing investigation and more easily formulate or revise counter-efforts. In short, the ‘‘records could reveal much about the focus and scope of the [agency’s] investigation, and are thus precisely the sort of information exemption 7(A) allows an agency to keep secret.’’ Swan v. SEC, 96 F.3d 498, 500 (D.C. Cir. 1996). As the district court noted, courts have relied on similar mosaic arguments in the context of national security. CNSS, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 103 & n.13. In Sims, for example, the Supreme Court cautioned that ‘‘bits and pieces’’ of data ‘‘ ‘may aid in piecing together bits of other information even when the individual piece is not of obvious importance in itself.’ ’’ 471 U.S. at 178 (quoting Halperin, 629 F.2d at 150). Thus, ‘‘[w]hat may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene and may put the questioned item of information in its proper context.’’ Id. (quotations omitted). Such a danger is present here. While the name of any individual detainee may appear innocuous or trivial, it could be of great use to al Qaeda in plotting future terrorist attacks or intimidating witnesses in the present investigation. Cf. United States v. 17 Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (‘‘[t]hings that did not make sense to the District Judge would make all too much sense to a foreign counter-intelligence specialist who could learn much about this nation’s intelligence-gathering capabilities from what these documents revealed about sources and methods.’’). Importantly, plaintiffs here do not request ‘‘bits and pieces’’ of information, but rather seek the names of every single individual detained in the course of the government’s terrorism investigation. It is more than reasonable to expect that disclosing the name of every individual detained in the post-September 11 terrorism investigation would interfere with that investigation. Similarly, the government’s judgment that disclosure would deter or hinder cooperation by detainees is reasonable. The government reasonably predicts that if terrorists learn one of their members has been detained, they would attempt to deter any further cooperation by that member through intimidation, physical coercion, or by cutting off all contact with the detainee. A terrorist organization may even seek to hunt down detainees (or their families) who are not members of the organization, but who the terrorists know may have valuable information about the organization. On numerous occasions, both the Supreme Court and this Court have found government declarations expressing the likelihood of witness intimidation and evidence tampering sufficient to justify withholding of witnesses’ names under Exemption 7(A). See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 239–42 (1978) (allowing withholding pursuant to Exemption 7(A) based on the risk of witness intimidation that would attend releasing witness statements prior to NLRB proceedings); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. EPA, 856 F.2d 309, 312–13 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (upholding 7(A) claim based on government declaration that disclosure would enable corporation under investigation to intimidate or coerce informing employees); accord Mapother v. Dep’t of Justice, 3 F.3d 1533, 1542–43 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (recognizing that government affidavits predicting witness intimidation and evidence fabrication ‘‘have achieved recognition in Exemption 7 caselaw’’); Manna v. Dep’t of Justice, 51 F.3d 1158, 1165 (3d Cir. 1995) (allowing 18 withholding of names of all ‘‘interviewees, informants, [and] witnesses’’ in criminal investigation based on fears of retaliation from organized crime). Most recently, we addressed in Swan a FOIA request that would have resulted in the disclosure of, inter alia, the identities of witnesses in an SEC investigation. 96 F.3d at 499. The SEC’s declaration alleged that disclosure would risk allowing the subjects of the investigation to ‘‘intimidate witnesses, manufacture favorable evidence, and conceal damaging evidence.’’ Id. We accepted the SEC’s declaration and allowed the documents to be withheld. Id. at 499, 500. The risks of witness intimidation and evidence tampering alleged here are at least as great as those in Swan and our other precedents. We see no reason to assume that terrorists are less likely to intimidate the detainees here than were the subjects of the SEC investigation in Swan. Consequently, we hold that disclosure of detainees’ names could ‘‘reasonably be expected to interfere’’ with the ongoing terrorism investigation. For several reasons, plaintiffs contend that we should reject the government’s predictive judgments of the harms that would result from disclosure. First, they argue that terrorist organizations likely already know which of their members have been detained. We have no way of assessing that likelihood. Moreover, even if terrorist organizations know about some of their members who were detained, a