Acquired Prudence

Prudence and Acquired Moral Virtue

Angela McKay

Catholic University

Draft

Thomas Osbourne has recently argued that Brian Shanley’s article “Pagan Virtue” offers an erroneous interpretation of Aquinas’ theory of virtue. Osbourne’s main complaint is that, under Shanley’s interpretation of Aquinas, a pagan can possess the acquired moral virtues. Against this Osbourne argues that under Aquinas’ theory of virtue, the acquired virtues cannot exist apart from grace – or at least, that apart from grace, the acquired virtues can be no more than disconnected inclinations to good actions. In making this argument, Osbourne echoes Jacques Maritain, who offers a similar argument in his book, Science and Wisdom. Both Osbourne and Maritain believe that definitive proof for their view can be found in the first and second articles of question 65 of the prima secunda, which they believe establishes that (1) without prudence, the acquired virtues can be no more than isolated dispositions to good actions, and (2) that prudence cannot exist without charity. Consequently, they argue, we cannot but conclude that (3) without charity there can be no prudence and hence no connected acquired moral virtue.[1]

Although both Osbourne and Maritain vehemently insist that any other account of the virtues goes against the letter and spirit of Aquinas’s moral theory, the most telling evidence against their claim is found in the text of Aquinas himself. For in the second article of his Disputed Question on the Cardinal Virtues – a text which both Osbourne and Maritain cite but which neither examine closely – Aquinas directly states that the acquired virtues, connected by prudence, can exist apart from charity. Does Aquinas then oscillate between two different accounts of virtue, offering one in one text and one in another? Or might it be that Aquinas’ position consistent between the two texts, and that he is simply misinterpreted by some scholars?

In this paper I wish to argue that, contrary to the view of Osbourne and Maritain, Aquinas consistently teaches that the acquired moral virtues, connected by prudence, can exist apart from grace. Osbourne and Maritain fail to see this, I shall argue, because they fail to attend to Aquinas’ distinction between acquired and infused moral virtue in general, and his distinction between acquired and infused prudence in particular. For although infused prudence cannot exist apart from grace, acquired prudence – a virtue drastically different from its infused analogue – can, and it is this latter form of prudence that is required to connect the acquired moral virtues. My argument will have three parts. First, I will examine the second article of Aquinas’ disputed question on the cardinal virtues, and show that Aquinas’ position here clearly contradicts the position held by Osbourne and Maritain. Second, I will argue that the argument Aquinas lays out in the earlier text is in no way contradicted by his discussion in the first and second articles of question 65 of the prima secunda. Rather than demonstrating – as Osbourne and Maritain believe – that the acquired virtues cannot exist apart from grace, these two articles follow the previous text in distinguishing three separate levels of virtue, two of which can exist without grace, and one of which cannot. Finally, I will address the concern which I believe motivates the interpretation offered by Osbourne and Maritain: the nature of acquired prudence. Osbourne and Maritain end up advocating a position contrary to that of Aquinas himself because they over-estimate the character of acquired prudence.

I. The Disputed Question on the Cardinal Virtues

The second article of the disputed question on the cardinal virtues, like question 65 of the prima pars, discusses the question of whether the virtues are connected, so that to possess one virtue is to possess all the virtues. As in the later text, Aquinas’ first move is to distinguish different kinds of virtue. For since some kinds of virtue are connected and some are not, we cannot address the question of the connection of the virtues without first establishing what type of virtue is under discussion. Aquinas thus offers two distinctions which he then uses to differentiate three levels of virtue: (1) virtuous inclinations, (2) the acquired virtues, and (3) the infused virtues. The latter two levels of virtue, Aquinas will argue, are connected, so that to possess one virtue is to possess all the virtues, and at both of these latter levels, prudence connects the other moral virtues. However, as we shall see in what follows, Aquinas clearly states that only the infused virtues depend on charity for their existence.

Aquinas begins his discussion of the connection of the virtues by making two distinctions, which he then employs to locate three different levels of virtue. Aquinas’ first move is to draw a distinction between perfect and imperfect moral virtue. A virtue is simply a good habit, and habits are said to be good or bad insofar as they bring man into conformity with the rule, or standard of human action.[2] A habit cannot be truly good and hence cannot truly merit the title of virtue, then, unless it succeeds in this. Aquinas thus designates those habits which bring man into only limited conformity with the rule of human action as “imperfect” virtues, and those which bring man into complete conformity, “perfect” virtues:

“It should be said that we can speak of virtues in two ways, as perfect and imperfect. Perfect virtues are connected to one another, but imperfect virtues are not necessarily connected. In evidence of which it should be noted that since virtue is that which makes a man and his work good, the virtue that makes a man’s work and himself good is perfect virtue, whereas the imperfect does not make a man and his work good simply speaking, but only in a certain respect.”[3]

The most basic distinction, then, has to do with whether or not virtue brings man into complete conformity with a standard of action.

Aquinas follows this initial distinction with a second, this time one which has to do with the standard of action that man is brought into conformity with. Virtue, as we noted above, brings man into conformity with a rule. However, Aquinas goes on to locate two different standards that man might be brought into conformity with. Virtue can either bring man into conformity with the rule of action “homogenea et propria homini” – right reason—or it can bring man into conformity with a higher rule, God himself: “Human acts are good simply speaking when they attain to the rule of human acts, one of which is, as it were, homogenous and proper to man, namely right reason, and the other a first transcendent measure, which is God.”[4] Even the term “perfect virtue,” then, admits of qualification.

Although Aquinas does not make this point until later in the article, it is worth noting that in pointing to the two different “rules” of human action, Aquinas is making an implicit reference to the difference between infused and acquired virtue. Aquinas consistently distinguishes infused and acquired virtue on the basis of the different “rules” they dispose man to act in accord with. This is because man, through his created nature, contains only the capacity for those habits which perfect him qua man – i.e. into conformity with the rule of action “homogenea et propria homini.”[5] He cannot, through his given nature, acquire those habits needed to bring him into conformity with his true end. Only grace, which effects a transformation in man’s very nature, renders man capable of attaining the “prima mensura transcendens, quod est Deus,” and consequently with the infusion of grace, man receives the habitual dispositions – the infused moral virtues – which make this sort of action possible.[6] Aquinas’ second distinction, then, is an implicit distinction between infused and acquired moral virtue.

In the ensuing discussion, Aquinas uses the above distinctions to posit three levels of virtue: (1) virtue “omnino imperfectum,” (2) virtue “aliqualiter perfectae,” and (3) virtue “simpliciter perfectae.” Although Aquinas will deny that the virtues need be connected at the lowest level, he maintains that the two higher levels of virtue are connected. Most importantly for our purposes, however, he will also state that the virtues at the second level, while connected to each other, exist apart from charity.

The lowest level of virtue, namely those that are “omnino imperfectum,” consists of those virtues which perfect man in some respect, but incompletely. Aquinas’ favorite example of habits that fall into this category of virtue are “natural inclinations” – the dispositions towards various kinds of action that exist in man from birth. Some people have, from birth, inclinations towards fortitude, temperance, or – to use an example frequently offered by Aquinas – mercy. Habits such as these give man an aptitude for performing certain kinds of actions, but they do not make him good in an unqualified sense because they are not accompanied by the ability to use those dispositions in the correct way. For example, a natural disposition towards fortitude, unaccompanied by right decision, can as easily be put to the service of bad ends as good.[7] It is precisely because these dispositions are unaccompanied by prudence, then, that Aquinas designates them as altogether imperfect: “There is then a threefold grade of virtue. For there are some wholly imperfect virtues which exist without prudence, not attaining right reason, such as the inclinations which some have to certain works of virtue even from their birth.”[8] The virtues at this lowest level are not connected – both because prudence is absent and because individuals can possess one natural disposition without possessing others – but more importantly, Aquinas denies that habits such as these are even truly deserving of the title of virtue: “Such inclinations are not all at once in everybody, but some have an inclination to one and others to another. Such inclinations do not have the mark of virtue, however, because no one uses a virtue badly, according to Augustine, but a person can use such inclinations badly and harmfully if he acts without discretion”.[9]

Above the virtues that are “omnino imperfectae,” Aquinas posits a second level of virtue, those virtues that are “aliqualiter perfectae.” These virtues differ from the lowest level in that they do attain the rule of human action, but they nonetheless still fall short of the true perfection of virtue because they lack charity and hence do not bring man into conformity with his true end: “The second level of virtues are those that attain right reason but do not attain God through charity. These are in a sense perfect with respect to the human good, but not simply speaking perfect, because they do not attain the first rule, which is the ultimate end”.[10]

Aquinas then proceeds to assert that the virtues at this second level, which attain right reason, but do not attain God in charity – and hence do not order man to his true end – are connected, and that they are connected by prudence: “If we understand virtues perfect at the second level, with respect to the human good, they are connected through prudence, because no moral virtue can be had without prudence nor can prudence be had if one is lacking moral virtue.”[11]

It is difficult to see this second level of virtue, virtue “aliqualiter perfecta” as anything but a direct contradiction of Osbourne and Maritain’s assertion that there can be no prudence and hence no connected acquired virtues apart from charity. For Aquinas’ not only appears to say precisely the opposite, but to construct the entire discussion around this point: man can possess habits that attain right reason, and yet fail to be ordered correctly with respect to the end of all human life, and habits of this sort are connected by prudence. Osbourne clearly interprets this text differently, for he flatly denies that this text says that the virtues which exist apart from charity are connected:

“According to Shanley, this threefold distinction shows that pagans can have those virtues which belong to the second grade even though they cannot have charity and the infused moral virtues. He seems to infer the position that the acquired virtues can fully exist without charity from the fact that the acquired virtues are connected through acquired prudence. To the best of my knowledge, neither John of St. Thomas nor Maritain denies that the acquired moral virtues are connected through prudence. The real issue is whether the virtue of prudence can exist in someone who lacks charity. Thomas does not address the issue in this article….For Shanley’s interpretation to be correct, Thomas would have to be arguing not only that the acquired virtues are connected through prudence but also that someone who does not have charity can have prudence.” [12]

Osbourne does not cite textual evidence for his claim, however, and the portions of text we have quoted seem to indicate precisely what he asserts they do not.

The third and highest level of virtue, or the virtues which are “simpliciter perfectae,” are the only virtues which perfect man unqualifiedly. While the virtues at the second level bring man into conformity with right reason, the virtues at the third and highest level of virtue bring man into conformity with the end of all human life: “The third level is of virtues that are perfect simply speaking, because they are with charity. These virtues make a man’s act good simpliciter, as attaining the ultimate end.”[13] When man is united to God in charity, says Aquinas, he is also infused with habits disposing him towards those actions to which charity inclines. Since charity inclines to the acts of all the virtues, all the virtues are infused along with charity.[14] These virtues, says Aquinas, are connected through charity, since if charity is present, all the other virtues are present as well, and none of these virtues can exist without charity: “Therefore, if we mean virtues perfect simpliciter, they are connected because of charity, because no such virtue can be had without charity and, if charity is had, all of them are had.”[15] Aquinas’ surrounding remarks indicate that the virtues at this third and highest level are not acquired, but infused. For immediately after asserting that the highest level of virtue allows man to attain his true end, Aquinas explains that when God unites man to himself in charity, he infuses in him the virtues that enable him to act in accord with his true end – the infused moral virtues. Immediately after this, Aquinas asserts that the virtues at the third level depend directly on charity, so that the virtues at the third level are present if and only if charity is. Since this is only true of the infused moral virtues, and since Aquinas has just explained that the virtues are connected at the third level because all the virtues are infused along with charity, it is reasonable to conclude that the virtues at the third level are infused.[16]

The three levels of virtue discussed in this text thus contradict the view of Osbourne and Maritain, under which the acquired virtues, apart from charity, can be no more than isolated dispositions to good actions. For in this text, Aquinas moves in a clear progression from (1) dispositions which exist apart from both charity and right reason to (2) dispositions which exist together with prudence but apart from charity to (3) the virtues that exist together with charity. Aquinas clearly states that the virtues at the second level are connected, and that they are connected by prudence. While such an assertion raises a number of questions – among other things, we would want to know how there could be prudence without charity, and what sort of prudence it would be – there is no getting around Aquinas’ statements here. It would take considerable effort to make this text say anything different.[17]

Since Osbourne and Maritain find the bulk of the support for their account of Aquinas’ theory of virtue in question 65 of the prima secunda, the passage laid out above provides us with only two possibilities. Either (1) Aquinas does in fact teach two contradictory theories of virtue, or (2) Aquinas’ teaching is consistent in both texts, and question 65 can be interpreted in a way compatible with the text above. It is the latter possibility that I shall argue for in what follows.

II. ST 1-2.65

If what I have argued in the above is correct, the text of DQCV contradicts Osbourne and Maritain’s position. What then are we to make of question 65, which they cite as the primary evidence for their interpretation? In what follows, I shall argue for the following two points. First, articles one and two of question 65 in no way contradict the text examined above. Aquinas devotes the first article of question 65 to the distinction between perfect and imperfect virtue, and the second article to distinguishing the virtues that are perfectae secundum quid (the acquired virtues) from the virtues that are simpliciter perfectae (the infused virtues), but in neither article does he contradict the text of DQCV. Second, while Aquinas does assert that the virtues are not connected without prudence, he never asserts that charity is a prerequisite of all prudence. To the contrary, he only insists that charity is a prerequisite of infused prudence, and he consistently makes this claim in the context of drawing a contrast between infused and acquired virtue. Nothing in this text, then supports the claim made by Osbourne and Maritain that charity is a prerequisite of all prudence and hence of connected acquired virtue.

The first article of question 65 is devoted to the question of whether the virtues are connected, so that to have one virtue is to have all the virtues. Aquinas’ response here, while not identical to that in DQCV, is very similar. As in the previous text, Aquinas’ first move is to distinguish perfect from imperfect moral virtue. He again cites natural dispositions as a paradigmatic instance of imperfect virtue, and in addition, various dispositions we acquire through custom: “We can consider moral virtue in either a perfect or an imperfect state. A moral virtue in an imperfect state (for example, temperance or fortitude) is simply the inclination we have for that good work, whether the inclination arises in us by nature or custom.”[18] Such inclinations are not connected, as is evidenced by experience – many people have inclinations towards some acts of virtue but not to others: “Taken in this way, the moral virtues are not connected, for we observe that some persons, by reason of natural temperament or of being accustomed to do so, are prompt in acts of generosity but not so prompt regarding acts of chastity.”[19]

Aquinas then proceeds, as in DQCV, to distinguish perfect from imperfect virtue on the basis of what virtue is supposed to do. Dispositions which truly deserve the title of “virtue” do not merely dispose one towards the performance of goods acts, but rather dispose one to perform good acts in the right way. Aquinas then gives two reasons why the latter sort of action requires that all the virtues exist together. First, one cannot be really brave unless one also possesses all the other virtues, for bravery is only commendable when it is moderate and just and so on.[20] But the second point reiterates much of what Aquinas says in DQCV. To perform a good act in the right way requires that we not merely be inclined towards a certain act, but that we make the right choice. Consequently, prudence is a prerequisite of every moral virtue: “there can be no moral virtue without prudence since it belongs to moral virtue, as an elective habit, to make a right choice. Now right choice requires not only an inclination to an appropriate end, which arises directly from the habit of moral virtue, but also the correct choice of means to the end, which is made by prudence.”[21]

Just as in the earlier text, then, Aquinas makes an initial division between perfect and imperfect moral virtue on the basis of the presence or absence of prudence. Only those moral virtues which exist together with prudence truly merit the title of “virtue,” and hence only those virtues can be termed “perfect” virtues. The difference is this: Aquinas does not, in the first article, distinguish between kinds of perfect virtue. He merely distinguishes perfect from imperfect moral virtue, and the only tool he needs for this is a reflection on the presence or absence of prudence.

Question 65, article 2

The first article of question 65 thus reiterates an uncontroversial point: without prudence, the moral virtues are not connected. If Osbourne and Maritain are correct, the second article offers a further stipulation, namely that the prudence needed to connect the virtues cannot exist without charity. However, when we examine the second article of question 65 closely, we see it actually makes a rather different claim. Rather than arguing that the prudence needed to connect the virtues cannot exist without charity, the second article seems exclusively devoted to contrasting the infused and acquired moral virtues. In the process of making this contrast, Aquinas argues that infused prudence cannot exist without charity, and hence that the infused moral virtues, which in turn cannot exist without infused prudence, cannot exist without charity. He asserts, on the other hand, that the acquired virtues can exist without charity. Given his earlier discussion in DQCV, then, there seems to be every indication that Aquinas is not merely continuing the first article’s distinction between perfect and imperfect moral virtue, but rather moving on to a further distinction between kinds of perfect virtue. Further support for this latter possibility is found in the fact that Aquinas says that the infused virtues are “simpliciter perfectae,” and the acquired are “perfectae secundum quid,” – vocabulary which looks back to DQCV’s distinction between the virtues “aliqualiter perfectae” and “simpliciter perfectae.”

After distinguishing between perfect and imperfect virtue on the basis of the presence or absence of prudence, Aquinas then proceeds in the second article to a discussion of whether and how moral virtue can exist without charity. His first move is to distinguish between the acquired moral virtues, which can exist without charity, to the infused moral virtues, which cannot. Since the acquired moral virtues are ordered to an end that doesn’t exceed human nature, they can exist without charity:

“As we have said, the moral virtues, inasmuch as they are productive of good works ordered to an end which does not surpass the natural capacity of man, can be acquired by human actions. And acquired in this way they can be without charity, as happened with many pagans.”[22]

The virtues that order man to his true end, however, must be infused by God and cannot – as Aquinas will argue in the following text – exist apart from charity:

“But insofar as [the moral virtues] are productive of good works in relation to a supernatural last end, and thus truly and perfectly attain the nature of virtue, they cannot be acquired by human acts but are infused by God.”[23]

Aquinas makes it clear from the outset, then, that the second article is not devoted to a contrast between two types of acquired moral virtue, but rather to a contrast between infused and acquired moral virtue. Moreover, he clearly states that virtue “simpliciter” – or virtue that truly and perfectly attains the nature of virtue – is infused virtue. The very fact of the contrast made here appears to exclude the acquired moral virtues from attaining the highest level of virtue because, as Aquinas explicitly states in the text quoted above, the acquired moral virtues do not order man towards his true end.

After distinguishing between the infused and acquired moral virtues, Aquinas then argues that the infused virtues cannot exist without charity. It is important to note that Aquinas again frames this argument in terms of a contrast between infused and acquired moral virtue. Most importantly for our purposes, a fundamental point of this contrast has to do with the fact that there are special pre-requisites for infused prudence – requirements that need not (as Aquinas later shows) be present for its acquired counterpart. The infused moral virtues cannot exist without charity: “the moral virtues of this kind [the kind that must be infused by God] cannot exist without charity.”[24] They cannot, explains Aquinas, because they cannot exist without prudence, nor prudence without the other moral virtues. But these virtues order man to the end “totius vitae,” and man cannot reason correctly about those things ordered to the ultimate end unless he is first appropriately ordered to the ultimate end in charity. Consequently, Aquinas concludes that infused prudence cannot exist without charity, and hence, neither can the other moral virtues, since they cannot exist without prudence: “Hence it becomes evident that infused prudence cannot exist without charity, nor the other moral virtues, for they cannot exist without prudence.”[25]

It is important to note a number of points about the text quoted here. First, Aquinas makes it clear from the outset that the entire discussion of charity is a discussion about why the infused moral virtues, unlike their acquired counterparts, cannot exist without it. Thus we must take his conclusion that neither infused prudence “nor the other moral virtues” can exist without charity as a conclusion that neither infused prudence “nor the other infused moral virtues” can exist without charity. For Aquinas has just contrasted infused and acquired virtue on the basis of the fact that the former orders man to the ultimate end and the latter does not. Second, nothing in this text implies the conclusion that the acquired moral virtues cannot exist without charity, nor that acquired prudence cannot exist without charity. Certainly, those virtues that order us correctly with respect to the end “totius vitae” cannot, but Aquinas has made it clear that such virtues are infused virtues.

This reading is borne out by the immediately following text, in which Aquinas continues the contrast between infused and acquired virtue. Because only the infused virtues order man to his true end, only these truly merit the title of virtue, while the others are virtues only in a certain sense:

“Accordingly, it is clear from what has been said that only the infused virtues are perfect virtues and are to be called virtues unqualifiedly, for they order man to his ultimate end absolutely. The other virtues, the acquired ones, are virtues in a restricted sense, and not unqualifiedly, for they order man well regarding the ultimate end in some particular kind of action, but not in regard to the ultimate end absolutely.”[26]

This final description, we should note, is markedly similar to the division between the two kinds of perfect virtue that Aquinas makes in DQCV.

The entirety of the second article, then, is devoted to a contrast between infused and acquired virtue. Aquinas’ main concern seems to be to demonstrate that only the former kind of virtue orders man to his true end, that therefore this kind of virtue, unlike its acquired counterpart, cannot exist without charity, and that therefore only infused virtue is true virtue. Nowhere does Aquinas make the assertion Osbourne and Maritain claim to find in this text, namely that the prudence that connects the acquired moral virtues cannot exist without charity. Aquinas’ only reference to the necessity of charity for prudence is made in the context of establishing the necessity of charity as a pre-requisite of infused prudence.

III. Acquired Prudence

If what I have argued in the above is correct, then the texts indicate that Aquinas believes that the acquired virtues can exist, connected by prudence, apart from charity. This very claim, however, seems problematic. For how could there be prudence in one who is not rightly ordered with respect to the end of all human life? It is most likely this worry, more than any actual textual evidence, that causes Osbourne and Maritain to seek a different teaching in Aquinas’ writings. When we examine Aquinas’ description of acquired prudence, however, this claim becomes considerably less surprising than it initially seems.

In the Treatise on Prudence in the secunda secundae, Aquinas provides a three tiered account of prudence that in many ways mirrors the three tiered description of virtue offered in DQCV. In the context of describing prudence, Aquinas describes three different forms of prudence: false prudence, prudence secundum quid, and prudence simpliciter. The second of these, which emerges from the discussion as acquired prudence, can exist without grace. It is this form of prudence – prudence secundum quid – that, I shall argue, connects the virtues which are perfect secundum quid.

Aquinas devotes the sixteen articles of question 47 to “prudentia secundum se,” or prudence in itself. After demonstrating that prudence is a virtue that belongs not merely to the cognitive faculty, but to the practical reason, Aquinas provides a detailed analysis of the parts of prudence (principal, subjective, and potential) and also defines the subject matter of prudence – who and what prudence is concerned with. But then, having considered what “prudential secundum se” is, Aquinas raises the question of who can properly be said to possess “prudential secundum se”. It is here, in his examination of who can be said to possess prudence, that Aquinas distinguishes three different kinds of prudence. While true prudence, or prudence simpliciter, is present in all and only those who have grace, the other two forms of prudence exist independently of grace.

The first statements relevant to this point occur in the thirteenth article of question 47. In the context of a response to the question of whether sinners can be prudent, Aquinas distinguishes three different kinds of prudence. The first and lowest form of prudence is a certain shrewdness, an ability to achieve one’s purposes, that is possessed by some of those who seek bad ends. The sinner who is adept at achieving evil ends is called “prudent,” not because he has genuine prudence, but because his ability has a certain resemblance to prudence. Such prudence is not true prudence, however, and is possessed only by sinners.[27]

The second form of prudence occurs when an individual has the ability to order himself towards genuinely good ends, but incompletely. Aquinas says that this ability may be incomplete for one of two reasons. First, it may happen that an individual can take good counsel, judge, and command rightly with respect to certain genuinely good ends, that the genuinely good end “non est communis finis totius humanae vitae, sed alicujus specialis negotii.”[28] Secondly, it may be that an individual is prudent enough to know the appropriate course of action, but lacks the principal act of prudence, command.[29] In both instances, there is something of true prudence. In the first, a genuinely good end is sought and achieved. This kind of prudence still falls short of true prudence, however, because the end sought is not the end “totius vitae.” Aquinas says that this sort of prudence can be in either the sinner or the just man, though the second form of incomplete prudence, where man knows the appropriate course of action but lacks command, is only found in sinners.[30]

Finally, Aquinas defines the third and highest form of prudence, prudence simpliciter, which cannot exist in sinners. This form of prudence is the prudence which “est et vera et perfecta quae ad bonem finem totius vitae recte consiliatur, judicat et praecipit; et haec sola dicitur prudentia simpliciter; quae in peccatoribus esse non potest.”[31] To have prudence simpliciter is to be well ordered with respect to the whole of life, totius vitae, which is to possess precisely what the sinner lacks – the rightly ordered affection for God, or charity, which is only bestowed with grace.

Though Aquinas does not use the infused/acquired vocabulary in this article, the categories of infused and acquired virtue are clearly operative in article 13. Specifically, it is clear that prudence simpliciter must be closely tied to, if not identical with, infused prudence. For the sinner is prevented from the possession of this kind of prudence precisely because, notwithstanding the ability he may have to order himself well with regard to assorted truly good ends, he does not have that ability with regard to the end “totius vitae”. He cannot do so because his affections are disordered, and his affections are disordered because he is not united to God in charity. The parallels between this statement and Aquinas’ distinction between infused and acquired virtue are obvious, for the acquired virtues can exist in sinners and remain with the loss of grace; the infused virtues, however, do not. That this is Aquinas’ intent in making the distinction between the various kinds of prudence is also indicated by his response to the second objection, which argues that since the sinner can possess faith he must also possess prudence. Aquinas replies that faith in its essence only involves knowing, and hence can be present without rightly ordered affection. Prudence, however, requires that man’s affections also be appropriately disposed.[32] If Aquinas’ stipulation that prudence simpliciter cannot exist unless one is rightly ordered with respect to the end of all life is not evidence enough that he is speaking here of infused prudence, his response to the objection about faith should settle the issue. For faith can be present in its essence without the rightly ordered affection that stems from charity; prudence simpliciter, says Aquinas, cannot.