Categories: Historical and Systematic Essays, edited by Michael Gorman
and Jonathan J. Sanford (
A collection of recent
essays.
Authors:
Jonathan Sanford, Helen Lang, Eleonore Stump, William McMahon, May Sim, Timothy Quinn, Carl Hausman,
Dagfinn Follesdal,
Papers – Perhaps I’ll put these online some day; in
the meantime, feel free to write me for a copy of anything you’re interested
in.
“Inspired Authors and Their Speech Acts.” Nova et Vetera 4 (2006): 747-760.
Employs speech-act theory (a) to support the
notion that biblical authors (not just their texts) are inspired and to (b) to
make some points about how we ought to react to scripture—in a nutshell,
scriptural passages vary in their illocutionary force, so appropriate responses
will vary as well.
“Talking about Intentional Objects.” Dialectica 60 (2006): 135-144.
Discusses the old
problem of how to characterize apparently intentional states that appear to
lack objects. In tandem with critically discussing a recent
proposal by Tim Crane, I develop the line of reasoning according to which
talking about intentional objects is really a way of talking about intentional
states—in particular, it’s a way of talking about their
satisfaction-conditions.
“Substance and Identity-Dependence.” Philosophical
Papers 35 (2006): 103-118.
There is no consensus on how to define
substance, but one popular view is that substances are entities that are
independent in some sense or other. E.
J. Lowe’s version of this approach stresses that substances are not dependent
on other particulars for their identity.
I develop the meaning of this proposal, defend it against some
criticisms, and then show that others do require that the theory be modified.
“
The paper takes up a traditional view that has
also been a part of some recent analytic metaphysics, namely, the view that
substance is to be understood in terms of independence. Taking as my point of departure some recent
remarks by Kit Fine, I propose reviving the Aristotelian-scholastic idea that
the sense in which substances are independent is that they are non-inherent,
and I do so by developing a broad notion of inherence that is more usable in
the context of contemporary analytic metaphysics than the traditional notion
is. I end by showing how non-inherence,
while necessary for being a substance, cannot be taken as sufficient without
some qualifying remarks.
“Nagasawa vs. Nagel:
Omnipotence, Pseudo-Tasks, and a Recent Discussion of Nagel’s Doubts
about Physicalism.”
Inquiry 48 (2005): 436-47.
Yujin Nagasawa interprets
Thomas Nagel as making a certain argument against physicalism
and objects that this argument transgresses a principle, laid down by Thomas
Aquinas, according to which inability to perform a pseudo-task does not count against an omnipotence claim. Taking Nagasawa’s
interpretation of Nagel for granted, I distinguish different kinds of
omnipotence claims and different kinds of pseudo-tasks, and on that basis I
show that Nagasawa’s criticism of Nagel is
unsuccessful. I also show how his
reflections do nonetheless point to a limitation of the approach he means to
criticize.
“The Essential and the Accidental.” Ratio
18 (2005): 276-89.
The distinction between the essential and the
accidental characteristics of a thing should be understood not in modal terms
(the received view) nor in definitional terms (Fine’s recent proposal) but as
follows: an essential characteristic of
a thing is one that is not explained by any other of that thing’s
characteristics, and an accidental characteristic of a thing is one that is so
explained. Various versions of this
proposal can be formulated.
“Augustine’s
Use Of Neoplatonism In Confessions
VII: A Response To Peter King.” The
Modern Schoolman 82 (2005): 227-33.
A cleaned-up version of my comments on
Peter King’s paper at the 2004 Henle Conference. Above all, an account of Augustine’s purposes
in discussing Neoplatonism in Confessions VII,
showing why Augustine doesn’t tell us certain things we wish he would.
“Metaphysische Themen in der Christologie des
Thomas.” In Thomas von Aquin: Die Summa
theologiae, Werkinterpretationen.
Ed. Andreas
Speer (
An overview of Aquinas’s
Christology, focusing on metaphysical issues.
“Categories and Normativity.” In Categories, ed. Michael Gorman and
Jonathan J. Sanford (
Sometimes being subject to a
norm is crucial to belonging to a certain category; such categories are more
common than one might think; Darwinian and other objections can be handled.
“Subjectivism about Normativity
and the Normativity of Intentional States.” International Philosophical Quarterly
43 (2003): 5-14.
The view that all norms are imposed
by beings with intentional states cannot be upheld.
“Hugh of Saint Victor” (3000 words), in The Blackwell Companion to
Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J. E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone
(Blackwell, 2003).
An overview of Hugh’s thought, focussing on philosophical issues.
"Intentionality, Normativity,
and a Problem for Searle." Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review
41 (2002): 703-13.
Searle’s view that mind is a biological
phenomenon like any other is incompatible with his understanding of
intentionality.
“But Then They Are Told…”. Logos 5 (2002): 173-9.
In
his discussion of the Ayala case, James Rachels
artificially separates two aspects of an action when the morally relevant point
is to see their connection.
“Personal Unity and the Problem of Christ’s Knowledge.” Proceedings of the American
Catholic Philosophical Association 74 (2000): 175-186.
Arguments against Chalcedonian
Christology on the basis of problems posed by Christ’s having both divine and
human knowledge cannot be avoided; they can, however, be refuted.
“Christ
as Composite According to Aquinas.” Traditio
55 (2000): 143-57.
A
proper grasp of Aquinas’s teaching that Christ is a composite person is crucial
to understanding his
Christology.
“Uses of the Person-Nature Distinction in Thomas’s
Christology.” Recherches de théologie et
philosophie médiévales 67 (2000): 58-79.
Aquinas uses the nature-person distinction in
several ways, some more successful than others.
“Logical
and Metaphysical Form: Lessons from the Theory of Dependence.” Proceedings of
the American Catholic Philosophical Association 69 (1995): 215-224.
Metaphysics must look after itself; dependence
as a case study.
“Ontological Priority and John Duns Scotus.” The Philosophical
Quarterly 43 (1993): 460-471.
The
seemingly inconsistent ways in which ontological priority is spoken of in
contemporary philosophy can be brought together under one heading, making use
of Scotus’s notion of essential order.
“Hume’s
Theory of Belief.” Hume Studies 19 (1993): 89-101.
Hume’s theory of belief looks
inconsistent, but it isn’t.
“Henry
of Oyta’s Nominalism and
the Principle of Individuation.” The Modern Schoolman 65 (1992):
135-148.
Henry’s view of individuation makes him a nominalist; this doesn’t stop him from talking about the
principle of individuation.
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