Politics in Western Jurisprudence
Kenneth Pennington
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Princeps legibus solutus est, Quod
principi placuit
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Quod omnes tangit
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In his work
Politica methodice digesta that he published in 1603 Johannes Althusius
defined politics as the “art of associating (consociandi) men for the purpose of
establishing, cultivating, and conserving social life among them.”
Althusius was an early modern German jurist who firmly believed that human
social institutions were and should be regulated by law. “Common law (lex
communis), which is unchanging, indicates that in every association . . . some
persons are rulers (heads, overseers, prefects) or superiors, others are
subjects or inferiors. For all government is held together by imperium and
subjection.”
“Local laws (leges propriae) are those enactments by which local associations
are ruled.”
Althusius did not think of politics as being primarily the art of conflict but
the art of living together. Law provided the foundation of a community’s social
structure.
Althusius lived in the waning years of the Ius commune, the common law that was taught in all of Europe’s law schools until the Protestant Reformation. It was not a set of statutes. Rather it was a set of norms and a jurisprudence that was based on ancient Roman, canon, and feudal law. It provided a rich source of jurisprudence for all European jurists. Although he was a Protestant, Althusius drew heavily upon legal traditions and sources of Pre-Reformation Europe. His Politics is studded with references to Hostiensis (Henricus de Segusio), Panormitanus, (Nicolaus de Tudeschis), Bartolus of Sassoferrato, Baldus de Ubaldis and many others. He summarized five centuries of jurisprudence in the Ius commune that dealt with all aspects of human concourse.
The Ius commune was born in the late
eleventh century.
In the early Middle Ages, Europe was a land without jurists. With the
establishment of law schools, first at Bologna and then in other Italian, French
and Spanish cities, jurists began to discuss issues that may be broadly defined
as political. In the modern world we primarily think of politics as a continuing
struggle between parties with differing ideological and economic beliefs. From
the thirteenth to fifteenth the Italian city states did have competing,
organized parties striving for control of political institutions of their
communities. The rest of Europe, for the most part, did not. Medieval jurists
dealt with political matters in two ways. They analyzed and developed legal
rules for the governance of political institutions from the office of the prince
to the corporate governance of cities, secular and ecclesiastical corporations
(guilds, cathedral chapters, monasteries), and representative assemblies. The
jurists were also called upon to render opinions on legal questions that arose
from political conflicts in medieval society. They became experts who were asked
to solve problems, answer questions, and advise princes. Law was established as
an important branch of learning, and jurists became an indispensable class in
the political life of European society.
1. The Jurisprudence of Sovereignty in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries
Law became important in political
debates of the second half of the eleventh century. The conflict between Pope
Gregory VII (1073-1085) and the German Emperor Henry IV (1056-1106) generated a
mountain of literature. One of the first signs that law would play a role in
political disputes was a treatise written by a certain Petrus Crassus. He used
Roman and canon law to defend Henry IV and cited Justinian’s Institutes
to establish the principle that kingdoms cannot be ruled without laws.
As law became important in politics and
in all other parts of medieval society schools were established to teach it.
Stories circulated about how the teaching of law originated. Not surprising some
of these tales credited rulers with encouraging the teaching of Roman law. One
of the most intriguing is a report by a German chronicler, Burchard of Biberach,
that Matilda, Countess of Tuscany, petitioned Irnerius to teach the books of
Justinian’s compilation. Whether the story is true or not it reflects an
assumption of the early twelfth century that rulers were interested in fostering
the study of ancient Roman law and that the knowledge of law would enhance a
ruler’s authority. In any case Irnerius was a major figure of the early twelfth
century who taught law in Bologna, advised the Emperor Henry V (1106-1125), and
served as a judge in Tuscany.
Legal historians generally credit him and an even more shadowy figure, Pepo, for
establishing Roman law as a field of study in Bologna.
The reign of the German emperor
Frederick I Barbarossa (1152-1190) marked the beginning of the jurists using
their recondite knowledge in the service of the prince. Frederick recognized the
importance of jurists and protected the Law School at Bologna with an imperial
decree, the Authentica Habita (1155), that granted the students at
Bologna special privileges. Three years later at an imperial Diet in Roncaglia
(near Piacenza) Frederick opened the assembly with a with an oration that
contained a remarkable number of references to texts of the libri legales,
the textbooks used at Bologna.
The emperor tacitly cited Justinian’s Digest, Code, and Institutes to justify
his rule. The texts of the libri legales legitimized his authority but
also protected the rights and liberties of his subjects. When he proposed new
laws, as he did at Roncaglia, he promulgated them but, he said, the people
confirmed them by accepting them through customary usage. He proclaimed that
laws must be just, possible, necessary, useful, and suited to the time and
place. He concluded by pointing out that one may not judge laws after they have
been established. Rather one must judge according to the laws. All of these
points were taken from the libri legales.
Frederick’s speech at Roncaglia was not
an isolated example of the importance of law for imperial rhetoric and policy.
Godfrey of Viterbo wrote a poem that exalted Frederick’s legislative authority
and employed the standard metaphors of the new jurisprudence to describe the
imperial office: the emperor was living law and could promulgate, derogate or
abrogate law.
Frederick promulgated new laws that treated the emperor’s rights and prerogatives in Italy at Roncaglia. An Italian chronicler wrote that Frederick summoned law professors from Bologna to advise him on his imperial rights that were due to him. One of the laws is particularly instructive.
The prince possesses all jurisdiction and all coercive power. All judges ought to accept their administration from the prince. They should all swear the oath that is established by law.
This law was entirely based on principles of Roman law. Frederick did not know Latin and was not educated in law. He gathered men around him who were experts of the libri legales, the new legal science. European princes would follow Frederick’s lead for the next 700 years. They gave jurists positions of power and authority in their curiae and used them as trusted and advisors. The laws that were promulgated at Roncaglia began a long tradition of medieval jurists’ contributing to the formation of a jurisprudence of sovereignty.
It is instructive to compare the
promulgation of King Henry II (1154-1189) of England’s Constitutions at
Clarendon (1164) to Frederick’s legislative work at Roncaglia. Henry made no
claim to have the authority to legislate. He gathered his barons and bishops
together to “recognize” royal liberties and prerogatives.
A “recognition” of law was the same term used to discover the facts of a case by
jurors in early English writs. In England law was not a manifestation of royal
prerogative; it was a fact that could be discovered by examining the customs of
the realm. There is no trace of the new jurisprudence of monarchical authority
in the rhetoric that justified the Constitutions.
The English kingdom would only begin to be influenced by the legal theories of
sovereignty of the Ius commune in mid-thirteenth century when the author called
Bracton attempted to describe the prerogatives of the king using some of the
same texts and language that were used to exalt Frederick Barbarossa’s authority
at the Diet of Roncaglia.
A story that circulated among the
jurists illustrates the authority that jurists began to exercise in medieval
society. The setting of the story was the Diet of Roncaglia. It may or may not
be true. The protagonists were two of the four great doctors and teachers of
Bologna, Bulgarus and Martinus. Frederick had summoned these experts to Bologna
to advise him. While riding with them on horseback on day, Frederick asked them
whether according to law he was the Lord of the World (dominus mundi). The idea
of the emperor being the “dominus mundi” was probably inspired by a passage in
the Justinian’s Digest.
In a passage taken from a commentary on the Rhodian Law of the Sea, the Emperor
Antonius declared that he was the “Master of the World” (tou kosmou kurios).
Another text of Roman law became closely associated with the imperial title in
the minds of the jurists. In a law that was included in his Code, Bene a
Zenone,
Justinian did not claim the title, Lord of the World, but he did assert that the
emperor could be understood to own all things. If the emperor owned all things,
it was a short step for the jurists to conclude that the emperor was, indeed,
the Lord of the World.
Frederick must have heard from people
in his court that the emperor had these grand titles. He asked the jurists what
authority and prerogatives such titles bestowed upon the imperial office. “Am I
legally the Lord of the World,” he asked. The tradition reported that Bulgarus
reported that he was not the lord over private property. Martinus responded that
he was, in fact, Lord of the World. Frederick rewarded Martinus’ sycophantic
answer with a gift of a horse.
In the second half of the twelfth
century the jurists who glossed Justinian’s codification dealt with these texts
and others that touched upon the emperor’s prerogatives. They concluded that the
prince did not have jurisdiction over his subjects private property under normal
circumstances. Rights to private property were protected by natural law. One
point should be emphasized. When Frederick asked whether he was Lord of the
World, no jurist interpreted his question as asking whether other kings were
subject to him. That question did not interest them. It would be left to Pope
Innocent III to broach that question at the beginning of the thirteenth century.
The twelfth-century jurists focused on his authority to take the rights of his
subject away and his prerogative to abrogate law arbitrarily. In other words
they were interested in the relationship of the prince to the law.
The Roman law libri legales gave
the medieval jurists very fragmented texts upon which they could construct a
theory of princely authority and the prince’s relationship to the law.
There is little in the Digest on a theory of law. A text in the Digest from the
Roman jurist Gaius stated that natural reason established law that is observed
among all human beings. It is call the Ius gentium or law of peoples.
This law and the customs and laws of individual cities (civitates) constituted
the laws under which human beings lived.
The libri also contained some definitions of terms at the beginning of
the Digest. The medieval jurist who began to study and comment upon ancient
Roman law did not, however, have a coherent set of texts upon which they could
create a jurisprudence that treated the nature of law. That task was taken up by
Gratian who began to teach canon law at Bologna in the early twelfth century.
When Gratian began teaching at Bologna, Irnerius was teaching Roman law at about the same time. Until recently the only secure fact that we knew about Gratian was that he compiled a collection of canons that later jurists called the Concordia discordantium canonum. This cumbersome title was later shortened to the Decretum. It very quickly became the most important canonical collection of the twelfth century and later became the foundation stone of the entire canonical jurisprudential tradition. It was not replaced as a handbook of canon law until the Codex iuris canonici of 1917 was promulgated.
Since the work of Anders Winroth in 1996 we have learned much more
about Gratian. Winroth discovered four manuscripts of Gratian’s collection that
predated the vulgate text of the Decretum. Since then another manuscript of this
early recension has been discovered in the monastic library of St. Gall,
Switzerland. Although all five manuscripts must be studied in detail before we
fully understand their significance, some conclusions can already be made. The
first recensions of Gratian’s work were much shorter than the last recension.
The differences between the recensions mean that Gratian must have been teaching
at Bologna for a significant amount of time before he produced his first text
that circulated. There was a significant period of time between when he began
teaching and the final version of the Decretum. Most evidence now points to
Gratian’s having begun his teaching in the 1120's. He continuously revised his
text until the late 1130's or early 1140's. In spite of its defects — more
organization was its primary flaw — it immediately replaced all earlier
collections of canon law in the schools.
Gratian became the “Father of Canon Law” because the last recension of his collection was encyclopedic and because with his “case method” he provided a superb tool for teaching. His vulgate version of the Decretum was a comprehensive survey of the entire tradition of canon law.
Gratian introduced jurisprudence into canonical thought. His first
innovation was to insert his voice into his collection to mingle with those of
the Fathers of Nicaea, St. Augustine, and the popes of the first millennium. He
did this with dicta in which he discussed the texts in his collection.
He pointed to conflicts within the texts and proposed solutions. His dicta made
the Decretum ideal for teaching, and the Decretum became the basic text of canon
law used in the law schools of Europe for the next five centuries.
In addition to the novelty of his
dicta, Gratian created a collection of canon law that was organized differently
than any earlier collection. In his earliest version of the text, Gratian
focused on 33 cases (causae). In each case he formulated a problem with a series
of questions. He then would answer each question by providing the texts of
canons that pertained to it. When the text of the canon did not answer the
question without interpretation or when two canons seemed in conflict, Gratian
provided a solution in his dicta. Gratian’s hypothetical cases were effective
teaching tools that were ideally suited to the classroom. Gratian was the first
teacher to use cases to teach law.
Perhaps the most important parts of Gratian’s work for the beginnings of European jurisprudence were the first twenty distinctions of the 101 distinctions (distinctiones) in the first section of his Decretum that he added to his original text. In these twenty distinctiones he treated the nature of law in all its complexity. Gratian must have realized that he could not teach law by looking only at cases and questions of fact. He had to make his students understand the sources of law. As I pointed out above, the libri legales did not discuss the relationship between the different types of law. Gratian did that in his first twenty distinctions. These twenty distinctions stimulated later canonists to reflect upon law and its sources.
Gratian began Distinction one with the
sentence: “The human race is ruled by two things, namely, natural law and
usages” (Human genus duobus regitur naturali videlicet iure et moribus). The
canonists grappled with the concept of natural law and with its place in
jurisprudence for centuries. Their struggle resulted in an extraordinary rich
jurisprudence on natural law and reflections on its relationship to canon and
secular law. Brian Tierney has noted that “natural law <did not> constitute a
significant limitation on the legislative competence” of the prince. It was also
not “a kind of detailed pattern of legislation laid up in heaven.” Rather,
natural law was provided a moral basis for deciding whether a given enactment
was a good and just law.
It was a set of norms that evolved in European jurisprudence through a long
gestation in the arguments of the jurists.
In some cases, the jurists found justifications for their arguments about which
norms were based on natural law in sacred scripture. In others, they could
discover no precedents in sacred scripture. Instead they relied on norms that
had evolved in the Ius commune. These norms conformed to reason, reason so
compelling that they expressed eternal truths. We shall see that the jurists
also used norms and principles that they defined as natural law to limit the
authority and prerogatives of the prince.
Gratian concluded that natural law dictated that “Each person is commanded to do to others what he wants done to himself,” connecting natural law with the biblical injunction to do unto others what you would have them do unto you (Matthew 7.12). By defining natural law as the duty to treat other human beings with care and dignity, Gratian stimulated jurists to reflect upon a central values of natural law: the rendering of justice and the administering of equity in the legal system. Most of the texts that Gratian used were taken from the Etymologiae of Isidore of Seville ©. 560-636). Isidore combined the various traditions of natural law that had circulated in the ancient world. He defined it as being the law common to all nations that was established by the instigation (instinctus) of nature, not by human legislation. Examples of natural law were marriage and the procreation of children, “one liberty of all human beings (una libertas omnium),” and the acquisition of property taken from the heavens, earth, and sea. Natural law was, as the Roman jurists had earlier concluded, natural reason. To define the contents of natural law Gratian placed Isidore’s definition of natural law on the first page of his Decretum (D.1 c.7). Together with the texts of Roman law in Justinian’s compilation, Gratian’s Decretum became one of the standard introductory texts for the study of law (the Ius commune) in European law schools, and Isidore’s definition became one of the most important starting points for all medieval discussions of natural law.
Gratian also discussed the various
types of human law: unwritten custom, civil law, the law of a city or of a
people, including definitions taken from Roman law. Law was a hierarchy. Under
Gratian’s schema laws were not simply a reflection of different usages in
various communities. All law had to be evaluated according to standards that
transcended human institutions. Law was also intimately connected to people. The
prince could not exclude his subjects from being an central source of law. The
people could not only make law, they could approve it. Gratian ended his
treatment of legislation by defining how law became valid: “Laws are established
through promulgation and validated when they are approved by the acceptance of
the people.”
Remarkably, Frederick Barbarossa used these very words when he described his
conception of his legislative authority at Roncaglia.
Gratian and Frederick marked the beginning, not the end, of the jurists contemplation of the role of the prince in making law. The jurists read the texts in the libri legales that described the emperor’s supreme legislative authority and were uncertain how to reconcile the authority of the medieval prince with the powerful tradition of customary law. Customary law had dominated Europe for centuries. Almost all local legal systems were based on customary law in the twelfth century. Frederick Barbarossa’s legislation at Roncaglia is one of the few examples that we have in the twelfth century of a monarch’s consciously exercising his authority to make new law.
The twelfth-century jurists did not
agree about the relationship of custom to new legislation. Irnerius wrote that
custom that was established by long usage should be preserved, particularly if
it were not contrary to reason and did not contradict written law. He did not,
however, think that custom could abrogate the decrees of the prince. “All power
of making law has been transferred to the prince.”
Other jurists argued that under certain circumstances, particularly with the
tacit approval of the prince, custom could derogate, if not abrogate, law. A
maxim began to circulate in legal circles that “custom was the best interpreter
of law.”
During the course of the twelfth
century jurists focused much more on the power of the prince to make new law
than on the right of the people to establish and be governed by their own
customs.
A few jurists noted that society needed new laws because change demanded it. By
the end of the twelfth century canonists had created a new concept to describe
the law promulgated by the prince or by governing institutions: positive law
(ius positivum). The term remains a fundamental legal concept in our
understanding of law.
The change from a legal system that
recognized custom as the primary source of law to one that gave primacy of place
to positive law was a difficult one. Southern European societies made the
transition more quickly and easily than did those of Northern Europe. The
Italian city states were the first to codify their customs and revise those
codifications regularly as their institutions and courts evolved. Pisa, for
example, produced a code of its laws by the middle of the twelfth century.
Gratian, Irnerius and the early jurists took most of their assumptions about law and it relationship to princely authority from Germanic customary law and feudal law. Customary law emphasized the contractual relationship between the people and the prince. Consequently for early jurists the prince had a sacred duty to defend the laws and customs of the land. The prince was bound by the law. They thought that law should be reasonable and just. Most importantly, the prince could not exercise his legislative authority arbitrarily.
At the beginning of the thirteenth
century the jurists developed new ways of looking at law. Until then jurist
focused on the content of law when they decided whether a law was just or not.
They presumed that law must be moral, ethical, equitable, and, most importantly,
reasonable. As new theories of legislation emerged from the Ius commune, the
jurists began to look at the sources of human law and the institutions that
produced positive law. It was then that they discovered the will (voluntas) of
the prince as a source of law. When they introduced the will of the prince into
political discourse, they created a new political language that became “the
basis of a new philosophy of law with Marsiglio <of Padua> and <much later with>
Hobbes and was the original kernel of the recently dominant theory of legal
positivism.”
The jurists were the first to look upon the will of the prince as being a
primary source of law. A canonist, Laurentius Hispanus (ca. 1190-1248) was the
first jurist to peer into the body of the prince to find his will.
Pope Innocent III (1198-1216) inspired
Laurentius to reflect upon the will of the legislator. No pope or other medieval
ruler shaped the political thought of the medieval jurists more than Innocent.
In his decretals the pope exalted papal political power. Innocent emphasized the
pope’s fullness of power (plenitudo potestatis) within the Church. Although the
term was coined in the early Church, Innocent found it particularly useful for
describing his authority. During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries,
secular rulers adopted papal terminology to describe their power and authority.
Innocent issued a decretal letter, Quanto personam, in 1198 in which he made an unprecedented pronouncement on the roots of papal authority. He claimed that the pope exercised divine authority when he granted a bishop the right to leave his church.
God, not man, separates a bishop from his church because the Roman pontiff dissolves the bond between them by divine rather than by human authority, carefully considering the need and usefulness of each translation. The pope has this authority because he does not exercise the office of man, but that of the true God on earth.
Laurentius
quickly understood the implications of Innocent’s rhetoric. He believed that
royal and papal authority was divinely ordained. That was a widely-held idea in
late antique, medieval, and early modern political thought.
Innocent, however, took this commonplace of medieval political thought and took
it a significant step further. He asserted that the pope’s authority rested upon
divine authority and also that the pope shared in God’s authority. That was a
significant innovation. For the future it meant that the pope could exercise
power that had hitherto been reserved only to God. Areas of law that had earlier
been defined as based on divine law — marriage and vows especially — could now
be subject to papal authority. If the pope shared authority and power with God,
he could abrogate or derogate divine law that was formerly beyond his
jurisdiction.
When Laurentius commented upon Quanto personam he defined a ruler’s
legislative authority in a novel and unprecedented way:
Hence the pope is said to have a divine will . . . O, how great is the power of the prince; he changes the nature of things by applying the essences of one thing to another . . . he can make iniquity from justice by correcting any canon or law, for in these things his will is held to be reason (pro ratione voluntas) . . . And there is no one in this world who would say to him, “Why do you do this?” . . . He is held, nevertheless, to shape this power to the public good.
No jurist had ever made the claim that the prince could make laws that were unreasonable and unjust. The jurists always agreed that laws should be just and be reasonable. Laurentius, however, asserted that reason was not the only standard by which law should be judged. The will of the prince and his will alone could be considered a source of human law. Earlier jurists had never distinguished clearly between the content of law and the source of law. Laurentius was the first jurist in European jurisprudence to argue that the content of law had no necessary connection to its source. It had been a doctrine of faith among the jurists who commented on Gratian’s tract De legibus that laws that were not reasonable were null and void. Laurentius, however, argued that the will of the prince must be supreme. He did not, however, argue that the prince could act arbitrarily. Later jurists did not use the maxim that he cited, “Pro ratione voluntas” (taken from Juvenal’s Satires) as a justification for tyranny.
Frederick Barbarossa’s jurists who discussed the authority of the emperor in the twelfth century had a different and more primitive view of monarchical authority. When they called the prince the “Lord of the World” and declared that he was “legibus solutus” (not bound by the laws), they focused on his status. The prince was sovereign, he was superior to the law, but he had to submit himself to the law. They did not explore the source of law or of the prince’s authority or the relationship of the prince and the law.
The reason for their reluctance to confront the issue of the relationship of the prince and the law was primarily because n the twelfth century the prince was not the only or even the main source of law in society. Only in the thirteenth century when princes began to legislate did the jurists began to think about the source the prince’s authority and to develop new definitions of the prince’s power.
Henricus de Segusio, or Hostiensis, (†
1271) was one of the most important and influential jurists of the thirteenth
century.
His career took him to Paris, London, and Rome. He wrote the most extensive
commentary on canon law produced by any jurist in the thirteenth century. His
work is characterized by a deep understanding of the political world, secular
and ecclesiastical, and a profound interest in the language of political power
and authority.
Hostiensis was sensitive to legal
questions that touched the structure of institutions. He developed a
jurisprudence that described the power of secular and ecclesiastical princes in
remarkably new ways. More than any earlier jurist he delved into the meaning of
the terms that the jurists been accustomed to use when they described power and
authority in medieval society. He extensively analyzed the traditional
terminology. He explored the term “Plenitudo potestatis” (fullness of power)
that had long been used to describe the power of the pope and that was beginning
to be used to describe the authority of the secular prince in minute and careful
detail.
Like Laurentius Hispanus, Hostiensis
was inspired by Pope Innocent III. Even more than Laurentius he emphasized the
divine foundations of papal power. He decorated Innocent’s claims in Quanto
personam with extravagant rhetoric. While commenting on Innocent’s decretal
letters he wrote that all political authority comes from God. All princes
exercised their authority by divine mandate. The pope, he asserted, had a
singular status. Hostiensis based his commentary on Laurentius’ but greatly
enhanced the pope’s power. Whatever the pope does, he wrote, he acts on God’s
authority. The pope is the vicar of God. The curia of the pope in Rome was God’s
curia. Whatever the pope does is licit as long as he does not err in the faith.
Whenever he acts “de iure” he almost always acts as God.
The pope exercised divine authority and presided over a consistory that reached from heaven to earth. Pope Innocent III might have thoroughly relished Hostiensis rhetoric. One inexorable conclusion that one might draw from Hostiensis commentary is that if pope’s authority is divine, then his law must also be divine. This logical conclusion did not escape Hostiensis. Divine law is the “Ars artium” (Science of sciences) that comprises human and canon law. Roman law is divine because the emperors created the rules of procedure by divine inspiration. The emperor is the living law (lex animata) whom the Lord has given to men and to whom He has subjected the law. Canon law was also divine. Theology was the head of the Church, canon law the hand, and Roman law was the feet. Sometimes the hand of the Church leads the head; sometimes the feet. Hostiensis did not create a new jurisprudence of law but outfitted traditional definitions with remarkable metaphors.
In one respect Hostiensis did break
with early jurisprudence. He insisted that canon law was a part of divine law
and that the pope, as vicar of God, promulgated laws that should be considered
divine. A similar metaphor for the secular prince circulated in canon law. When
princes issue laws, they are divinely promulgated through his mouth (leges
divinitus per ora principum promulgatae).
This is true, concluded Hostiensis, only indistinctly. Only the pope could
promulgate law divinely. “The pope, not the emperor, is the general vicar of
Christ.”
Hostiensis’ most important and lasting contribution to the language of political thought was creating a new set of terms to describe sovereignty and the power of the prince. Roman jurisconsults introduced the jurists of the Ius commune to the basic language of sovereignty. The Roman jurisconsult Ulpian coined the most widely used terms defining the prince’s authority: “what pleases the prince has the force of law (quod principi placuit vigorem legis habet)” (Dig. 1.4.1) and “the prince is not bound by the law (princeps legibus solutus est)” (Dig. 1.3.31). Twelfth-century jurists used these two maxims to establish two principles: that the prince can legislate and that he can change law. The jurists also expressed the concept of legislative sovereignty with the maxim “an equal cannot have authority over an equal” (par in parem imperium non habet). This maxim expressed their conviction that a ruler could not bind his successor. No twelfth-century jurist permitted the prince to act or to legislate arbitrarily.
Roman jurists called the emperor’s
power to legislate, command, and judge “imperium” or “potestas.” Ulpian wrote
that the Roman people had transferred “imperium” to him (Dig. 1.14.1). Most
medieval jurists thought that the people’s bestowal of power on the prince could
not be revoked. Borrowing from theologians’ terminology describing the power of
God, Hostiensis gave the pope a glorified new definition of his authority. The
pope and God both ruled by a “potestas absoluta and potestas ordinata.”
Since Hostiensis thought that the pope promulgated law divinely he followed the
logic of his theory and concluded that terminology describing God’s power should
also apply to the pope. The pope was the first human being to wield divine
power, but jurists soon bestowed “potestas absoluta” on secular princes.
Like Laurentius before him Hostiensis blazed a new path for the jurisprudence of sovereignty. He separated legal thought from primitive Germanic ideas of kingship that law was custom and that the king was bound by the law. With his “potestas ordinata” the pope had the authority to exercise jurisdiction over positive law; “Potestas absoluta” enabled the pope to exercise extraordinary authority and jurisdiction. With this exalted power the pope could legislate in matters touching the laws of marriage and vows, areas of the law that had been considered a part of divine law and outside papal jurisdiction.
“Potestas absoluta et ordinata” played a very important role in the future. Later jurists defined the prince’s power with these terms and sometimes concluded that the prince could take the rights of subjects away when he exercised his absolute power. In combination with Laurentius’ “pro ratione voluntas” the jurist used “potestas absoluta” to create more a sophisticated jurisprudence of sovereignty. The prince was the source of law. He was not always limited by reason or morality. Under some conditions the prince could promulgate laws that were contrary to reason. He could sometimes act contrary to the precepts of justice. The jurists justified these aberrations of political behavior by citing two other norms: the common good of society and great necessity. But by the later Middle Ages the jurists could defend the prince who acted contrary to law, custom, and who violated individual private rights. Hostiensis laid the foundations for later jurists to embrace an absolutism that ignored the traditional rights of subjects.
Along side this development, however, medieval “constitutionalism” remained an important strand of thought in medieval jurisprudence. The jurists who were reluctant to adopt the theory of absolutism emphasized limitations on the prince’s power. Their first line of defense against arbitrary power was the rights of subjects. From early in the twelfth century jurists asserted that property rights were founded on precepts of natural law or the “ius gentium.” Further, the prince did not have the right to alienate his lands. When the jurists argued that property rights were grounded in natural law they could claim that the prince could not violate those rights since he had no jurisdiction or sovereignty over natural law. It was a higher law that transcended human positive law.
The alienation of property was a key
issue for the jurists. From the late twelfth century they realized that rights
that attached to the office of the prince and not to his person belong not to
the prince but to the common good. A forged document drew their attention to the
issue. In the so-called Donation of Constantine the emperor was purported to
have granted his imperial rights to the Church. The document was a forgery of
the late eighth or early ninth century.
The text of the forgery was included into canon law by Gratian. In the early
thirteenth century Pope Honorius III (1216-1227) issued a decretal letter,
Intellecto, in which he asserted that the King of Hungary could not alienate
royal lands that injured his kingdom and the crown. Honorius laid down the
doctrine of inalienability in canon law. The canonists immediately expanded the
principle to the ruler of the Church. A little later the Roman lawyer Accursius
argued that the Donation of Constantine was not a binding document. The emperor,
he concluded, could not injure the rights of future emperors (par in parem
imperium non habet). The jurists established the doctrine of inalienability of
rights as being a significant limitation on monarchical power.
The jurists of the Ius commune created
another powerful limitation on the power of the prince: the “ratio iuris”
(reason of law) and the norms of law.
They coined legal maxims that were taken from Roman law, early medieval legal
thought, and from their own analysis. These maxims were touchstones of justice
and equity in law. These maxims can be found in their commentaries, the
decretals of popes, and secular laws. They provided a benchmark by which the
acts of the prince could be judged.
In the thirteenth century the jurists
began to discuss monarchical power and authority and create a jurisprudence
based on contemporary secular law. The Emperor Frederick II (1212-1250) issued
the first royal code of laws in 1231, the Constitutions of Melfi, also known as
the Liber Augustalis. In the prologue to his codification he (or more
likely, his jurists) discussed the authority of the prince.
The prince is an instrument of God. His duty is to establish laws, to promote
justice, to promote justice, and to correct and chastise wrongdoers.
Thus we, whom God has elevated beyond any hope man might have cherished to the pinnacle of the Roman empire and to the singular honor of all other kingdoms at the right hand of divine power, desire to render to God a two fold payment for the talents given to us, out of reverence for Jesus Christ, from whom we have received all we have.
In a later constitutions Frederick contrasted his authority with that of the ancient Roman emperors.
It is not without great forethought and well-considered planning that the Quirites [Roman citizens] conferred the right and imperium of establishing laws on the Roman prince through the Lex regia. Thus the source of justice might have its source from the same person that defends justice. He who ruled through the authority established by Caesar.
The descriptions of authority that we find in the Liber Augustalis resonant and reverberate with the doctrine that we have describe in the Ius commune.
The pope was a ruler who claimed universal jurisdiction over all Christendom. When Frederick Barbarossa asked Martinus and Bulgarus if he were the Lord of the World, the jurists ignored the obvious meaning of the question: did the emperor hold a higher office and exercise jurisdiction over kings? Martinus and Bulgarus interpreted Frederick’s question as being whether he could take the rights of his subjects away. Could the emperor take away the property rights of his subjects?
Frederick Barbarossa may have had more interest in his status in relationship to other kings than the jurists did. The English King Henry II wrote a letter to Frederick in which he bestowed the title “Dominus mundi” on the emperor. Henry might have thought that he pleased the emperor with that title. However, modern historians have found the question whether this indicated that the emperor claimed superiority over kings much more interesting than the medieval jurists did. They have argued that the national monarchies could not be sovereign until they had been freed from the yoke of imperial universal jurisdiction. Yet this question did not seem to be important to the jurists. None of them broached the question whether the emperor exercised e de facto or de iure sovereignty over other European Christian princes.
Some modern historians have asserted
that the “state” did not exist in medieval Europe because papal and imperial
sovereignty could not exist under the umbrella of these two universal rulers.
How could states exist when jurists argued that the pope had the right to judge
princes and their subjects in a number of different matters? A true state could
not exist if its sovereignty was not untrammeled. Some jurists did, however,
present an exalted view of imperial power and prerogatives. The canonist
Johannes Teutonicus wrote in a gloss that eventually became a part of the
Ordinary Gloss of canon law:
The emperor is over all kings . . . and all nations are under him . . . for he is the Lord of the World . . . even Jews are under him . . . and all provinces are under him . . . unless they can show themselves to be exempt . . . none of the kings can have prescribed an exemption, since prescription has no place in this . . . A Kingdom cannot have been exempted from imperial authority, since it would be without a head . . . and that would be monstrous. Rather all must give the emperor tribute, unless they are exempt . . . All things are in the power of the emperor.
If Johannes had been in the emperor’s company at Roncaglia, Frederick would have probably given him a stable of horses for his glorious summary of imperial authority.
Not all the jurists found Johannes’
glorification of imperial power edifying. Sometimes their reaction was clearly
based upon a nascent sense of national identity. In reaction to Johannes’ gloss
the canonist Vincentius Hispanus (ca.1180-1248) would have none of his
exaltation of Teutonic virtue.
Make exception, Johannes Teutonicus, of the Spanish, who are exempt by the law itself. They did not admit Charlemagne and his peers into their lands. I, Vincentius, say that the Germans lost their imperium through their own stupidity . . . Only the Spanish have obtained imperium through their virtue.
Oddly, Pope Innocent III (1198-1216) was the first to state categorically that the kings were independent of the emperor. Innocent issued a decretal letter, Per venerabilem in 1202 in which he stated that the king of France recognized no superior in temporal affairs. Innocent’s decretal was included into canonical collections, and the jurists began to analyze Innocent’s comment. Some concluded that kings were subject to the emperor de iure, but not de facto. Others argued that kings were entirely independent and free from imperial jurisdiction. They created a maxim to describe royal independence: “Rex in regno suo imperator est” (A king is emperor in his kingdom). By the middle of the thirteenth century this maxim had become a commonplace.
Modern historians have argued about the maxim’s precise meaning. Some historians have pointed out the maxim is not an unambiguous justification for royal independence from universal imperial rule. In the period from ca. 1270-1330, the jurists of the Ius commune used the maxim to argue three different points. First that every king is independent of the emperor and that every king can exercise the same prerogatives within his kingdom as the emperor. The king was, in other words, the prince of Roman law. Second that the kings were not independent of the emperor but that they did have the same prerogatives as the emperor in their kingdoms. Third, that kings were independent of the emperor but could not exercise the same prerogatives as the emperor in their kingdoms. They were not princes. Whatever the case, by the late Middle Ages the jurists had created a sophisticated and nuanced jurisprudence of sovereignty that shaped the political arguments of Early Modern European thinkers.
2. The Importance of Feudal Law for Political Institutions in Medieval Society
The jurists created a vigorous doctrine of kingship and defined the relationship of the prince and the law with originality and creativity. Roman law provided them with their terminology, but Christian conceptions of justice and duties shaped their thought. Feudal law revealed to the jurists another side of the prince’s nature: his limitations and duties to his subjects.
Feudal law was born in an age without
jurists. It was customary, unformed, and existed in a wide variety of forms.
There was no pervasive paradigm of European feudal law as there was for Germanic
customary law. The sources from all over Europe in the period 800 to 1000
contain the terms lord (dominus), vassal (vassalus), fief (beneficium or feudum).
Later jurists would carefully analyze and define their meaning. Historians,
however, have learned that when they find these words in early medieval sources,
they cannot simply assume that these words describe the lord and vassal
relationship that is found in later feudal law: that a lord bestowed a fief upon
a vassal in return for military service. The vassal swore homage and fealty to
the lord. This was the basis of the feudal contract and established a
complicated set of norms that governed the princes duties and obligations to his
vassals. It also defined a vassals duties to his lord.
The word that described a fief in the tenth and eleventh centuries (sometimes, but not always, a piece of land) a was generally beneficium. Although the word, “feudum,” from which the English word feudal is derived, is found in early sources, it replaces beneficium as the standard word to describe a fief only during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. For political relationships the feudal contract had several advantages over a contract in Roman law. The feudal contract could be inherited and broken for political reasons. When a feudal contract passed from one generation to another, the bonds that the contract cemented were renewed in public ceremonies that reminded each party of its obligations and duties.
Law can exist without jurisprudence, but law without jurisprudence creates ambiguities that can be destructive for the public good. Unless there are jurists to interpret the law, the rights of persons and institutions are never secure. Although Roman and canon law had standard libri legales there were no books or standard texts for feudal law. By the twelfth century feudal customary law began to define far more than just the relationship between and lord and his vassal. Secular and ecclesiastical institutions were involved in legal relationships that were feudal. Clerics took oaths to their bishops; kings took oaths to the pope. There was a need for written law and a jurisprudence that would provide an interpretive tool to understand what these oaths meant. Monasteries had feudal ties with persons and institutions. Bishops had feudal relationships with men and towns. Towns had feudal contracts with other towns and persons. The nobility had traditional feudal contracts with vassals but also with towns. Feudalism, in other words, had become much more than contract that regulated and defined a relationship between a “lord” and a “vassal.” Lawyers who studied the new Ius commune at Bologna and other schools realized that texts were needed
The books of feudal law were formed in
the second half of the twelfth century out of disparate sources. Obertus de Orto,
a judge in Milan, sent his son Anselm to study law in Bologna ca. 1154 and 1158.
Anselm reported to his father that no one in Bologna was teaching feudal law.
Obertus wrote two letters to his son (that may be rhetorical conceits) in which
he described the law of fiefs in the courts of Milan. It may be that the primary
reason why Obertus wrote these two letters was that a compilation of customary
law was being undertaken by the commune of Milan. Whatever the case may have
been, Obertus’ two letters became the core of a set of texts for the study of
feudal law. Obertus put his letters together with other writings on feudal law,
especially from Lombard law, to create the first of three “recensions” of the
Liber feudorum (in the manuscripts the book was named Libri feudorum,
Liber usus feudorum, Consuetudines feudorum, and Constitutiones feudorum).
The manuscripts of the first two recensions reveal that there was no standard
text. Some of them included eleventh and twelfth-century imperial statutes of
the emperor’s Conrad II, Lothair II, and Frederick I. The second recension often
contained the letter of Fulbert of Chartres and additional imperial statutes.
Typical of legal works in the second half of the twelfth century the jurists and
scribes added texts of various types (extravagantes) to this recension. Almost
no two manuscripts contain exactly the same text. The jurists did not comment on
the Liber feudorum of Obertus. The text’s entry into the schools must
have been slow. The first jurist to write a commentary on the Liber was
the jurist of Roman law, Pilius. He wrote his commentary on the second recension
of the Liber feudorum ca. 1192-1200, probably while he was a judge in
Modena. He did not comment on all parts of the Liber. Although the letter
of Fulbert of Chartres circulated in many manuscripts he did not gloss it. He
left the interpretation of Fulbert’s letter to the canonists (Gratian had placed
the letter in his Decretum). This fact illustrates an important point about
feudal law in the twelfth century: its jurisprudence was not the product of one
area of law but of the Ius commune.
The final or vulgate recension of the
Liber feudorum added constitutions of the Emperor Frederick II, the
letter of Fulbert, and other texts that had circulated in the twelfth-century
manuscripts. Accursius, the most important jurist of Roman law in the thirteenth
century, wrote a commentary based on Pilius’ in the 1220's. It may have gone
through several recensions, not all by Accursius. Accursius also wrote the
Ordinary Gloss on the rest of Roman law at about the same time. His authority
and the importance of feudal law combined to give Liber feudorum with
Accursius’ Ordinary Gloss a permanent place in the Ius commune.
Feudal relationships generated legal
problems and court cases in the later Middle Ages. The earliest reports of court
cases involving feudal disputes and using feudal law date to the late twelfth
century, and their numbers proliferate during the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries. As the number of these cases increased, jurists were called upon to
write consilia (legal briefs) to solve them. I shall discuss some of the
consilia that jurists wrote for feudal legal problems in section four below.
The feudal oath was the central element in the feudal
relationship. The use of oaths to cement political and social relationships was
not peculiar to European society. In almost all human societies oaths embedded
in rituals create social bonds.
The feudal oath of fidelity that a vassal took to his lord is almost emblematic
of the popular and scholarly image of medieval social relationships. In the
Liber consuetudinum Mediolani, a compilation of the customs of Milan that
was promulgated in 1216, there is an oath that the vassal should take to his
lord:
I, <James>, swear that henceforward I will a faithful man or vassal to my lord. I will not lay open to another what he has entrusted to me in the name of fealty to <my lord’s> injury.
The text of
the custom enigmatically concludes: “Many things are contained in these words,
which are difficult to insert here.”
The sentence would have been puzzling, however, only to those who did not know
feudal law. A thirteenth-century jurist reading this text would have recognized
immediately that the compilers of the customs were referring to a letter of
Bishop Fulbert of Chartres (1006-1028).
By 1216 Fulbert’s letter had been the
most important legal text for defining the oath of fealty for a century. The
letter’s origins lie in a request that William V, count of Poitou and duke of
Aquitaine made to Fulbert asking for advice about the obligations and duties
that a vassal owed to a lord. William had troubled relationships with his
vassals. In his reply (ca. 1020) Fulbert wrote a short treatise on feudal
relationships that circulated fairly widely.
Gratian treated clerical oaths in Causa 22 and placed it in the earliest version
of his Decretum (C.22 q.5 c.18) ca. 1124. It became a locus classicus for
canonistic discussions of the feudal contract and the relationship of the lord
and vassal.
Fulbert told William that when a vassal
took an oath to his lord six things were understood to be contained in it
whether explicitly expressed or not: to keep his lord safe, to protect him from
harm, to preserve the lord’s justice, to prevent damage to his possessions, and
to not prevent the lord from carrying out his duties. Fulbert alleged that he
got this list from written authorities, but his exact source, if there were one,
has never been discovered. For the next four centuries jurists cited Fulbert’s
list of obligations and duties as being central to the feudal oath of fealty.
The text in Gratian’s Decretum reads:
The form of fidelity that anyone may owe to a lord and vice versa, may be found in a letter of Bishop Fulbert.
Since I was asked to write something about the oath of fidelity, I have noted for you these things which follow from the authority of books. Whoever swears fidelity to his lord should always have six things in mind: safe, secure, honest, useful, easy, possible. Safe, namely, lest he injure his lord with his own body. Secure lest he not injure his secret interests or his defenses through which his lord can be secure. Honest lest he not injure his lord’s justice or in other matters which seem to pertain to his honesty. Useful lest he injure his lord’s possessions. Easy or possible, lest that the good, which his lord could easily do, he would make difficult, and that what would be possible, he would make impossible for his lord. A faithful man should pay heed to these examples.
It is not sufficient to abstain from evil, unless he may do what is good. It remains that he faithfully give his lord counsel and help in the aforementioned matters, if he wishes to be worthy of his benefice (fief) and safe in the fidelity that he has sworn. The lord also ought to render his duty to his faithful man in all things. If he does not, he may be thought of as faithless, just as he, who in consenting or telling lies will be perfidious and perjurious.
Huguccio (ca.
1190) was the first canonist to give Fulbert’s letter a close reading and
extended commentary. At the beginning of his commentary he noted that many
things are tacitly understood when someone took an oath, vow, and promise.
He then discussed each of the six tacit obligations listed by Fulbert. A vassal
could not injure his lord’s body without cause or unjustly. Huguccio interpreted
the oath of fidelity by placing its obligations against the norms of the
jurisprudence of the Ius commune. If there was cause or reason (causa et
ratio) a vassal could injure his lord.. These two norms (cause and reason) were,
perhaps, the most powerful in medieval jurisprudence and generally trumped any
rule, law, custom, or statute.
If the vassal was a judge or a magistrate — a social situation into which only
urban vassals would probably fall — he could punish his lord if he merited it.
According to Huguccio, Fulbert’s principle of honesty encompassed two points. A
vassal could not injury a lord’s justice or his women. First he observed that
according to customary law, even though it was unwritten, a vassal could not
testify against his lord in court. Again he looked to others norms of the Ius
commune to qualify the prohibition. If justice and cause demanded it, the vassal
could testify against him because his lord had no justice.
Then Huguccio turned to sexual morality. Perhaps he had read too many French
lais about the sexual misconduct of the nobility. He defined vassal’s honesty as
not violating the women who surrounded his lord. The lord’s wife and daughter
were, understandably, not to be touched. Huguccio, however, also included any
other woman in the lord’s home. In summary, the vassal should not do any
dishonest thing in his lord’s house.
This may be another example of Huguccio’s propensity to embrace moral absolutes,
what later canonists called the “rigor of Huguccio.”
In any case Johannes Teutonicus placed only his lord’s wife and daughter outside
a vassal’s predatory field.
Huguccio then turned to the vassal’s
obligation to give his lord counsel and help. His first point was the vassal was
only obligated to give aid when the lord needed help in licit and honest
affairs. If the lord was injured a vassal should respond immediately, but within
reasonable limits (moderatio inculpatae tutelae) and with attention to the
admonition of Saint Paul in Romans 12:19: an enemy should be treated with
respect; disarm malice with kindness.
The concept of justifiable defense that Huguccio cited (moderatio inculpatae
tutelae) is taken from Roman law and slowly penetrated the Ius commune during
the twelfth century.
It was typical of twelfth-century jurists to combine Roman and Biblical precepts
to establish a legal norm.
Huguccio then turned to the question of
the moral and legal responsibility of a vassal to defend others. Nobody should
sin for himself or for another, he reflected, but at the same time everyone has
an obligation to defend anyone from injury.
Huguccio’s presumption is completely contrary to the norms of British and
American common law where the doctrine of nonfeasance has held sway. Under the
influence of the Ius commune, however, most civil law legal systems have a
duty-to-assist other persons in their jurisprudence.
Huguccio had no doubt that every man had a duty to assist another person. For
him the duty to render aid reflected in some way a person’s commitment to the
common good. If everyone has an obligation to render assistance, he wondered,
what is the legal force behind the vassal’s duty to help his lord? How would a
vassal’s duty to a lord differ from his duty to aid others in distress?
He found the answer to that question in a conciliar canon: “I say that the
vassal is bound to his lord <by the oath of fealty> more willingly and more
specially — just as in the conciliar canon from the Council of Toledo in
Gratian’s Decretum. That canon stated that oaths to uphold promises make the
breaking of those promises to be feared.”
Huguccio quoted a phrase from the canon and expected that his readers would
supply the complete quotation: “specific promises are more to be feared than
general vows.”
Later canonists followed Huguccio lead that insisted that a vassal must do more
than just defend his lord when he is in danger. Alanus Anglicus (ca. 1200)
formulated a lapidarian expression of the precept: “Although the oath of fealty
does not expressly state it, a vassal should give heed that his lord may not be
injured.”
Tancred (ca. 1215) and following him, Bernardus Parmensis in the Ordinary Gloss
(ca. 1245), insisted that persons who swore oaths of faithfulness and obedience
must not only protect them from attack and harm but they were bound to protect
them from plots and dangerous plans.
This principle remained an important part of the oath of fidelity.
It also shaped the mores of political action in European society for centuries.
A vassal’s obligation to aid his lord
militarily was Huguccio’s next topic. He formulates several hypotheticals. What
if the lord wishes to seize his fief or his property? The vassal must not obey
his lord unless his lord’s war would be just. The vassal is not bound to obey if
his lord moved against him personally.
What, however, if the lord moved against his son or his father? Huguccio’s
answer relied on juridical distinctions drawn for the family, kin, and vassals
of excommunicates.
The vassal did not have to obey his lord when his son and father lived under the
same roof. Otherwise, if his lord were waging a just war against his family, the
vassal was held to obey his lord.
Huguccio addressed his final topic at
the end of his commentary. Fulbert’s letter laid down the norms that a vassal
must adhere to if he were worthy of his fief. Huguccio noted that the other side
of the coin was that if a vassal did not show himself worthy by violating these
principles, his lord could take his fief (beneficium) away from him.
He then linked the rules governing a vassal’s loss of his fief to the
ecclesiastical sphere. What if, he asked, a cleric offered legal protection and
assistance (patrocinium) in a case against his own church or against his bishop
to whom he has sworn fidelity? Huguccio thought that the cleric should lose his
benefice unless he was pursuing his own legal case or that of his own people. He
concluded by noting that while their lords are excommunicated, those who have
sworn oaths of loyalty are not compelled to obey them.
The canonists who wrote after Huguccio
expanded upon the jurisprudence that he created for the oath of fealty.
Importing another definition from Roman jurisprudence, Alanus commented that a
vassal who betrayed his lord fell under the Roman law of treason.
The jurists liked that connection. A number of them repeated it.
Johannes Teutonicus copied this gloss into his Ordinary Gloss where it remained
a principle of feudal law until the end of feudalism. The Roman law of treason
specified the death penalty for the crime. The canonists turned a traitor from a
perjurer to capital felon. It was no small step. They marked a stage in the
development of law in which the rights and honor of the lord became identified
with much more than another person. He became the symbol of the territorial
state. The Chansons de geste had long emphasized a warrior’s
faithlessness as the ultimate betrayal (“trahison”) in a world of honor.
At the beginning of the thirteenth century the jurists of the Ius commune
followed the poets.
Fulbert of Chartres’ letter in Gratian’s Decretum provided the canonists with an opportunity to enter directly into the feudal world. The church had long used oaths of obedience, and, as we have seen, the canonists saw the ecclesiastical oath as an institution governed by the same rules as the secular feudal oath of fealty. Canon law continued to contribute to the jurisprudence of feudal law after the twelfth century but did not produce any legislation as central as Fulbert’s letter. Pope Innocent III (1198-1216) touched upon feudal matters in many of his letters. Two of them entered the official collections of canon law under the title De feudis. One of these letters shaped feudal law in an important area: the right of a lord to bestow a fief when he had taken an oath not to bestow a fief on someone else. Feudal law in the later Middle Ages found its jurisprudential roots in Roman law, canon law and in secular legal systems. This cross-fertilization accounts for the vigor of feudal law until the end of the sixteenth century. As we shall see in part four of this essay the jurists used the norms of feudal law to define political relationships until the seventeenth century.
3. The Jurisprudence of Secular and Ecclesiastical Institutions
Monarchy was the primary form of
government in the Middle Ages. Although the Italian city states established
republican forms of government in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, by the
fifteenth century most had reverted back to princes. As most medieval jurists,
theologians, and people were, Dante was convinced that monarchy was the proper
and legitimate form of government when he wrote Monarchia in the early
fourteenth century. The legitimacy of monarchies were rarely seriously
questioned.
It was typical for medieval people to
think of themselves as belonging to various collective organizations. Some of
these groups were local. Others occupied a larger stage. In the twelfth century
the jurists began to define the relationships of these organizations to one
another and the legal rights of the individuals within them. The jurists named
these organizations, secular and ecclesiastical, “universitates.” A good example
of their thought is the canon law of ecclesiastical corporations, especially the
legal status of the bishop to his chapter. The cathedral chapter constituted a
“universitas” or corporation that represented the local church. By the
thirteenth century, a bishop’s power and the exercise of his office was limited
by a new conception of the bishop’s juridical personality that embraced the
joint authority of the bishop and the cathedral chapter.
The jurists of the Ius commune used rules and norms that the canonists developed
and applied them to other corporate entities from secular gilds to church
councils and, in part, even to the Roman curia.
In the period between ca. 1180 and
1300, the canonists generally concurred that the bishop and chapter together
constituted the basic administrative unit of the diocese. The canons of the
cathedral chapter usurped the rights of the lower clergy and spoke for the
people and the clergy of the entire diocese. To describe this new juridical
entity, the canonists worked out corporate theories. In canonistic thought, the
relationship of the bishop and the cathedral chapter divides into three
categories: What the bishop can do in the name of the church; what the chapter
may do without the consent of the bishop; and what the bishop and chapter ought
to do together. The canonists limited both the bishop and chapter considerably
in what they could do alone. Normally a bishop and chapter had to alienate
property , to confer benefices and offices, to ordain priests and to judge cases
in the episcopal court jointly. One canonist, Johannes Teutonicus, asked whether
the consent of the parish priests was necessary in some cases, a question that
may have still been asked by recalcitrant conservatives in the early thirteenth
century. In the late twelfth century Huguccio and Laurentius thought that in
some cases parish priests ought to be consulted by the bishop and chapter.
Johannes and the later canonists were not, however, inclined to let the parish
priests share in the governance of the diocese.
One can detect attitudes about the
proper governance of the universitas in a letter from late in the pontificate of
Innocent III. The bishop of Vic, Guillem, ruled over a difficult and contentious
cathedral chapter. While on a visit to Rome he must have complained to the pope
about his canons and pleaded for papal intercession to support episcopal
authority. Innocent issued a decretal letter to the bishop in which he laid down
the general rule that reasonable enactments of the cathedral chapter should not
be thwarted by a few canons. He mandated that when the bishop and the “potior et
sanior” members of chapter ordained something that unless the smaller part of
the chapter’s objections were supported by reason, the will of the bishop and
chapter should prevail. Innocent concluded that if the canons refused to come to
the chapter’s meeting or if they left during disputes that their absence could
not be considered grounds for appealing the decisions of the bishop and maior et
sanior pars of the chapter.
Since the beginning of the twelfth century jurists and popes had used the phrase
“maior et sanior pars” to describe the members of a monastic community or of a
cathedral chapter who had the legal right to rule and to consent to measures
established by the universitas (corporation) with the abbot or the bishop. As we
will see below, the same terminology began to be used to describe a majority of
electors when secular corporations chose their rectors. These principles of
reason and of majority became cornerstones of the jurists’ political thought in
the microcosm and the macrocosm.
If the participation of the entire clergy in the governance of the diocese represented the old world, we can discern a tension in canonistic electoral theory between the rights of the local cathedral chapter and its corporate prerogatives and the expanding claims of papal power. Electoral theory is important for understanding the relationship of the person of the bishop and his territorial domain, his diocese. The bishop gradually became a stranger in a strange land during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. They were no longer native sons who were born in the local diocese; they were not even committed to a stable, monogamous marriage with their churches. We can see in the jurisprudence of thirteenth-century electoral theory a reflection of the old and new order of episcopal power.
The key to the canonists views on
election is their opinions on what constitutes a numerical majority in an
election. The canonists adopted the term maior et sanior pars from the rules
governing the governance of the universitas and used it to describe a majority
of the electors in a corporation. The maior et sanior pars was not a numerical
majority — although it could be — but was the most important part of the
corporate body. Geoffrey Barraclough has written optimistically that “it is
striking enough that the church had the wisdom to reject the democratic fallacy
of ‘counting heads,’ and to attempt an estimate of the intelligence and
enlightened good faith of the voters.”
What may have seemed wise in the context of 1934 does not resonant as well
today. Nonetheless, Barraclough’s generalization is off the mark for the Middle
Ages because the church did not have the wisdom to reject fallacious democratic
reasoning until the first half of the thirteenth century. The double papal
election of 1159 had demonstrated to the canonists the dangers of rejecting
democracy. In this case the papacy and the canonists quickly concluded that
elections based on the principle of majority rule avoided schism and fostered
stability. At the Third Lateran Council of 1179 a conciliar canon established
the rule that a pope-elect must have the consent of a two-thirds majority in the
college of cardinals.
In the early thirteenth century
Johannes Teutonicus propounded a theory of election that advocated a clear
numerical majority in ecclesiastical elections.
But Johannes was one of the last of the Old School. His theory was rejected by
Bernardus Parmensis and, most importantly, by Pope Gregory IX, who stated in the
decretal, Ecclesia vestra, that the maior et sanior pars must not always
be a numerical majority.
The most interesting aspect of Johannes’ electoral theory is his view on
electing an “extraneus,” a foreigner, as bishop. As we have seen, until the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, most bishops were local men. Although Johannes
was a fervent democrat in ecclesiastical elections, he was a committed oligarch
when an ecclesiastical corporation wanted to elect an extraneus. Johannes may
have been reacting to the increasing presence of foreign shepherds among local
flocks. He believed that an extraneus could be elected only if there were no
worthy candidates to be found locally, and only if the election were almost
unanimous. Almost unanimous in this case means all but one. If the chapter
elected an extraneus but two canons favored a local candidate, the two canons
become the maior et sanior pars no matter how many canons voted for the other
candidate.
Johannes’ electoral theory reflects his conviction that foreign shepherds should not care for local flocks. He believed that an extraneus could be elected only with great difficulty, and he believed that even the pope could not provide a bishop to an unwilling flock. Johannes firmly rejected the constitutional structure of the church that was slowly evolving during his lifetime.
Johannes Teutonicus was in a minority. All the later canonists agreed that the cathedral chapter could elect an extraneus if the bishop had been elected by the maior et sanior pars. Johannes, the old conservative, conceived of the church as being a local institution, serving local interests, and controlled by local people. In general his ecclesiology emphasized local rights. This idea that local rights were important remained an important element in the medieval Ius commune.
Johannes’ jurisprudence of the norms
governing the “universitas” were kept alive in the secular sphere if not the
ecclesiastical, especially in the governments and guilds of the Italian cities.
By the later Middle Ages the church was moving steadily towards centralization.
The person of the bishop became a prince who ruled over his territory. His
territory was more clearly defined than it had ever been, and his jurisdiction
over institutions within his territory was more vigorously defined than it had
ever been. The bishop, however, became less a creature of the diocese. The bonds
between a bishop and his flock were attenuated and the legal relationship
between them diminished. By the later Middle Ages, when bishops were generally
appointed by papal mandates rather than elected by local cathedral chapters, the
metaphors that had traditionally described the bonus pastor often became more
and more rhetorical embellishments rather than descriptions of reality. The
diocese and the bishopric were the forerunners of the modern state. Bishops,
like secular princes, exercised increasingly centralized jurisdiction over their
territories. What happened within the structure of the Church was replicated in
the Italian city states where despotism in one form or another replaced
communal, corporate rule.
In ancient Roman law a “universitas”
was an association of persons in both public and private law. The jurists used
the terminology of Roman law to describe medieval corporations but expanded the
scope and importance of corporate theory in law. Already in the twelfth century
an anonymous jurist called the “people” a “universitas.” Although the norms
governing corporate governance were established by the jurists of the Ius
commune, these norms were modified by local custom and practice. From their
thorough analyses of corporate law, the jurists created a doctrine of community.
In particular they defined the relationship of the head of the corporation to
the members. What was particularly significant was that corporate theory began
as a juridical description of small groups but became a tool that the jurists
used to describe the secular state and the entire church. As Brian Tierney has
put it:
The decretalists themselves, down to Innocent IV, certainly had no intention of providing arguments for critics of papal sovereignty; but in fact a more detailed analysis of the structure of corporate groups was precisely what was necessary to provide a sounder juristic basis for the rather vague “constitutional” ideas that occur in decretist works.
Consequently, for a complete understanding of the political thought of the medieval jurists one must delve into their corporate theory of representation.
The bishop’s position in the
“universitas” could be seen from two perspectives. He could be seen as the sole
ruler of the cathedral chapter and the diocese. He could also be seen as a ruler
who shared his authority with the canons of his chapter. In the early twelfth
century Gratian had put some texts into his Decretum that stipulated that a
bishop must govern with the consent of his chapter. In later canonical
collections there were two titles that touched directly upon the relationship of
the bishop and his chapter: “Concerning those things which a prelate may do
without the consent of his chapter” and “Concerning those things which a greater
part of the chapter may do.”
A number of papal decretals under these two titles established the norms by
which cathedral chapters should be governed. The bishop could not alienate
ecclesiastical property, he could not unilaterally grant clerics benefices and
stipends, he could not make any important decision without the advice and
consent of his chapter. After reading these papal decretals no canonist could
have possibly concluded that a bishop could act alone without his chapter in all
matters.
A much more authoritarian bishop was
attractive for a few canonists. Pope Innocent IV (1243-1254) was a distinguished
canonist. He rejected the model of corporate governance supported by most
canonists.
Rectors who govern corporations have jurisdiction and not the corporations. Some say that a corporation may exercise jurisdiction without rectors. I do not believe it.
Innocent put forward a simple, absolutist theory of corporate government that may have been influenced by Roman law. The Roman jurists did not have a sophisticated theory of corporations. The model of rulership that emerges in the texts of Roman law is that the people bestow authority on the prince but do share in his rule.
When the canonists described corporate governance within the Church they developed much a more complex model of governance. The question of authority arose most often when ecclesiastical property and stipends were at issue or when the corporation was involved in litigation. The jurists created rules that dictated when a rector and the members of a corporation should act together or when they could or should act separately. They constructed a model of rulership in which sometimes the rector would sit in the corporation and act with the members and when the rector would act independently. Hostiensis, for example, argued that when the bishop sat in his chapter as a canon his vote was equal to that of any other member of the chapter. If, however, the chapter was negligent, then the bishops could exercise all the rights of the chapter alone. If the bishop acted in matters that touched his prerogatives, his vote was equal to all the members of the chapter. In this case, the bishop could make decisions with the vote of one other canon. The bishop and one other canon constituted the “maior et sanior pars.” Hostiensis was careful to protect the rights of the church against negligent prelates and canons. When the “status ecclesiae” (state of the church) was at stake, that is fundamental rights and duties that touched the well-being and prerogatives of the entire local church (universitas) the bishop must have the consent of the maior et sanior pars of the entire chapter.
Medieval political thought was influenced in two ways by the jurists’ theory of corporations. The jurists described the complicated relationship between the prince and his subjects in the macrocosm with the same rules that they applied to the microcosm. These ideas about the proper relationship of the bishop to his chapter, the pope and his curia, the prince and his court, and, ultimately, the prince in his representative assembly (council or parliament) became fundamental norms for a just and proper doctrine of rulership.
The juridical personality of the group
quite naturally became a concern of the jurists. During the late twelfth and
early thirteenth century the jurists began to realize that the corporation could
be represented by a delegate that they named a procurator, syndicus, or
advocatus. This delegated official could defend the interests of the universitas
in court. His actions, the jurists decided, would be binding on the members of
the universitas. The delegate possessed “plena potestas” or “generalis et libera
administratio.” With the proper mandates the official could sell, buy, lease,
make contracts as well as representing the interests of the universitas in
court. The jurists placed two significant limitations on the exercise of his
authority. He could not exceed the terms of his mandate and could not injure the
rights of the universitas.
The
jurisprudence of representation and its bedfellow consent entered European society
larger
part of ecclesiastical governance in the early thirteenth century. When Pope
Innocent III convened the Fourth Lateran Council he instructed bishops to inform
members of their chapters to “send good men to the
council.”
After having been summoned to the Fourth Lateran Council,
chapters were not shy about asserting their new rights to participate in
councils. They quickly claimed the right to be represented by procurators and
through these representatives to be voting members of local synods.
Archbishops and
bishops were not universally happy with the claims of chapters, and the issue
was joined. In 1216 the archbishop of Sens refused to permit representatives of
the cathedral chapters in Sens to participate in a provincial synod. The
chapters appealed to Pope
Honorius III. The pope supported their claim
decisively in the decretal Etsi membra. The pope’s arenga was a stirring
sermon on the corporate body of the Church and the interdependence of each
individual member.
"Although the members of Christ’s body, which is the Church, do not have one function but diverse ones . . . He placed each person in that body so that the members constitute one body. The eye cannot say to the hand “I don’t need what you do” or the head to the feet, “you aren’t necessary to me.” Still more important, the weaker members of the body seem to be necessary."
Honorius
instructed the archbishop and his suffragans that he intentionally wrote his
arenga for them as an admonition. The archbishop had denied representatives (procuratores)
of the cathedral chapters admittance to comprovincial councils in which matters
touching their interests were treated. The archbishop had defended his position
in a letter to the pope.
Honorius, however, did not find his reasons, whatever they were, convincing.
We and our brothers the cardinals were in complete agreement that those chapters ought to be invited to such councils and their nuncios (nuntii) ought to be admitted to the business of the council, especially those about matters that are known to concern the chapters.
Further,
Honorius concluded, the archbishop should follow the mandate of this decision in
the future.
“When the head gives the members their due
the body shall not experience the ravages of schism but will remain whole in the
unity of love.”
Richard Kay
calls Honorius’ decretal “a landmark in the development of representative
government.”
He is absolutely right. The canonists immediately expanded the right to attend
provincial councils by representatives of cathedral chapters into a more general
right of persons whose interests were affected by the business of the council.
During the thirteenth century provincial synods included representatives of
cathedral chapters as a matter of course.
Etsi membra
became a key legal justification that persons and
ecclesiastical institutions had the right to send representatives to assemblies
that dealt with issues pertaining to their interests and that they, through
their representatives, had the right to consent to new legislation. The decretal
also justified claims of representation in the secular realm.
Honorius III’s decretal became a part
of canon law, and canonists commented on it for the next four centuries. Shortly
after Honorius promulgated Compilatio quinta in 1225, Jacobus de Albenga
alluded to the fundamental but unarticulated principle that lay at the heart of
Etsi membra, a norm that was decisive when the pope and his cardinals
decided to support the canons and not their archbishop and bishop.
Honorius, he wrote, embraced the right of cathedral chapters to participate in
councils
“because what touches them ought to be decided by them.”
In the middle of the thirteenth century Bernardus Parmensis explicitly quoted
the maxim in his Ordinary Gloss to the decretal that Jacobus alluded to:
What
touches all ought to be approved by all (Quod omnes
tangit ab omnibus approbari debet).
Jurisprudential
norms of the Ius commune were powerful tools for shaping institutions
in medieval society. Etsi membra is a splendid example of how a legal
principle could inform a judicial decision and regulate the rules governing the
calling of a council. The logic of the decretal’s argument could be understood
as meaning that any council should invite persons who were not normally present
in the deliberations of the council when it dealt with matters touching their
interests. Jacobus de Albenga saw the logical implications of the decision and
explained that although lay persons were not normally invited to church
councils, if the issues that were to be decided by the council touched their
interests, they too should be summoned. Such issues could be matters of faith
and of marriage
Procedure
Not every pope was as sympathetic to
Honorius III’s conception of the Church as an interdependent body with mutual
rights. As Brian Tierney has noted many years ago:
The canonists’ tendency to personify the individual churches, to discuss problems of their internal structure in terms of anthropomorphic imagery, did not influence the actual content of their doctrines so much as is sometimes supposed. The head-and-body metaphor could so easily be adapted to support any constitutional solution.
Tierney
demonstrated that Pope Innocent IV, who was also a great jurist, had an unitary
vision of the corporation, the papacy, and the Church, and he conceived each as
“regimen unius personae.”
When Innocent came to gloss Honorius’ Etsi membra he did not want to deal
with a text with which he had so little sympathy. “Repeat what we have said in
our commentary above on the canon of the Fourth Lateran Council Grave.”
And if his readers or listeners did as they were instructed they learned again
the pope’s uncompromising “strict authoritarianism.”
In Grave Pope Innocent III had decreed that prelates and chapters who are
convicted of bestowing ecclesiastical benefices upon unworthy candidates more
than two times should lose their authority to confer benefices. Provincial
councils were to investigate and judge these cases.
First Innocent distinguished between episcopal and provincial councils. He noted
that only bishops of the province must be summoned to the provincial council
that would judge these cases of irresponsible electors but that abbots, priests,
and the clergy of the city should be summoned to episcopal councils.
Innocent conceded that cathedral chapters ought to be summoned to provincial
councils when matters that concerned them were treated. Otherwise they were not
admitted to provincial councils unless it were a matter of “honesty” or
“counsel.”
Advice, however, was very different from a legal right to participate in
conciliar affairs. Innocent’s silences speak even more clearly about his
conception of the Church than what he does say. He completely ignores the
earlier discussions about the rights of laymen, cathedral chapters, and others
to participate in councils. His vision of his Church did not include the idea of
representation and consent in the body politic. Later jurists, however, accepted
the right of corporations to be represented in church councils and secular
assemblies. Pope Innocent IV’s views remained in abeyance until the sixteenth
century when “strict authoritarianism” had a revival in the ecclesiastical and
secular realms.
As the jurists explored and developed a
jurisprudence that governed the universitas, they created norms that regulated
the political life of medieval and early modern society. Perhaps the most
significant norm that they established was “Quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus
approbari debet” (What touches all ought to be approved by all). Consent and
counsel of the members of the universitas, whether it was a guild or a kingdom,
became a cornerstone of juristic thought. As time went on these principles were
applied to the pope and the college of cardinals, the bishop and his chapter,
the rector and his universitas, and the prince and his realm. The doctrines of
corporate governance became a counterweight to the old and still powerful
theories of monarchical rule. They were not just alternatives to monarchical
rule. The jurists argued that these norms of corporate governance should be
integrated into princely government. They were a powerful force for limiting the
power of the prince. The jurists, more than any other group, created “medieval
constitutionalism.”
4. The Jurists’ Role in Shaping the Political Thought from 1250 to 1700
If one were to look at only the
commentaries of the jurists on Roman, canon, and feudal law of the late Middle
Ages one would be struck by the great continuities in political thought from the
twelfth to the seventeenth century. Many of the issues that the jurists
discussed were the same. They discussed the authority of the prince and the
rights of his subjects. They continued to elaborate and expand their
understanding of corporate theory. They responded to contemporary political
institutions. The city states of Italy made them consider the relationship of
small local states to the empire and national monarchies. Many questions were
raised about the juridical structures of these new states. Could they legislate?
Did their rulers have the same authority as the prince? Did the rights and
duties of the rectors and members of the universitas apply to them? In the end
the jurists answered yes to all these questions.
The jurists
developed their political ideas when they explicated the texts of ancient
Roman, canon, and feudal law. Although they commented on these texts with a
constant eye on the structures and institutions of the societies in which they
lived — their jurisprudence was not desiccated academic law — their greatest
contributions to political thought came as recognized experts from whom European
rulers sought legal advice.
The literary vehicle that they used in their work was the consilium.
Jurists wrote consilia at the request of clients who ranged from princes to city
states, from judges to litigants.
They presented the facts of the case and then solved it after having presented
both sides of the argument.
For some jurists writing consilia
became a significant source of income. One of the most prolific jurists, Baldus
de Ubaldis, was said to have earned 15,000 ducats just for writing consilia on
testamentary substitutions.
Early the jurists also began complaining about the pay they received for their
efforts. Between 1246 and 1312, Jacobus Palliarensis of Siena wrote a consilium
for Amadoris de San Gimiignano and noted that “his small payment was transformed
into a large stipend by the affection of the judge who had sent it to him.”
As we have seen princes sought the opinions of jurists from early in the twelfth
century. Although Frederick Barbarossa did not, it seems, ask Martinus and
Bulgarus for a written opinion about the breadth of his political authority, the
emperor’s question reflected the rising status and importance of jurists for
medieval politics.
By the end of the twelfth century we
have some evidence that judges turned to jurists for professional opinions about
legal cases. The earliest examples demonstrate that judges and institutions
turned to famous teachers of law for opinions.
These teachers applied their expert knowledge and the principles and norms of
the Ius commune to questions of law and questions of fact in the local courts.
This process demonstrates that the jurisprudence of the Ius commune transcended
the practices of the local courts and at the same time was seen as set of
authoritative norms that served as guideposts and benchmarks for legal practice.
The jurists could not know the customary and statutory law of all the local
jurisdictions where they were asked for opinions, but their knowledge of the
norms of the Ius commune was seen as indispensable for bringing local practice
into concordance with universal principles of justice, reason, and equity.
Oldradus'
Consilium
We have a singular example of Pope Innocent III issuing a consilium in a political matter in 1203. The tract was included in his register, was later included in collections of canon law. In his register it has the rubric Consilium quod dominus papa Innocentius misit crucesignatis sine bulla. No other letter in the entire corpus of Innocent’s letters was labeled a consilium. That fact is remarkable for two reasons. As we have seen a consilium had become the term designating a response written by jurists to a particular legal problem. A consilium was not a judgment nor a binding statement of law on those for whom it was written. Even if it written by the pope, a consilium was advisory and not normative. The rubric stated that Innocent sent the consilium to the crusaders “sine bulla.” Consequently, his consilium was not a definitive judgment, and we may understand “sine bulla” as underlining that point.
The contents of the consilium reflect
Innocent’s attitudes and motivations at a key moment during the Fourth Crusade
in which the Venetians and the crusaders were taking a course that would lead
them to the walls of Constantinople. It was a political decision that Innocent
opposed but that he could not hope to control. Innocent permitted the crusaders
to sail with the Venetians until they reached the lands of the Saracens or the
province of Jerusalem. Innocent compared the Venetians to an excommunicated
paterfamilias. In the Ius commune a paterfamilias was the head of a family.
Family members did not have to shun contact with him if he were excommunicated.
Innocent warned the crusader, however, not to wage war with the Venetians after
they reached the lands of the Saracens unless the Venetians had been absolved.
When the crusaders received Innocent’s consilium they certainly understood that
the pope issued it for political purposes with the help of his curial jurists. The
document warned them indirectly not to attack Constantinople and not to
collaborate with the Venetians after they reached the Holy Land. This is the
first political consilium that we have in the Ius commune.
Bulgarus and Martinus gave Frederick Barbarossa oral opinions. From the early
thirteenth century the jurists regularly responded to questions in writing.
Although Innocent III’s consilium was a precocious anticipation of a rich genre, it differed from the consilia that began to flourish in the fourteenth century in significant ways. First, and most importantly, the consilia were written by private, professional jurists. They were not written by princes and popes. If rulers who possessed legislative and judicial power and authority wrote consilia their purpose would have been obviated. They would have been considered legislation rather than advice. In the case of Innocent’s consilium the canonists included it into the collections of canon law. They transformed the document from advisory to depositive. Consilia were primarily meant to be advisory. Their purpose was to counsel the great and the small about the juridical norms that were significant for a particular legal problem. Consilia became an important literary genre because they were written by jurists who attempted to persuade, not to mandate. They became authoritative because of the prestige of the jurist who wrote them but even more from the power and force of the arguments contained in them. The reason of the law was far more important than the status of the litigants.
The second half of the thirteenth
marked the beginning of the Age of Consilia that would last for the rest of the
Middle Ages. By the sixteenth century consilia rivaled commentaries as the most
important genre of legal writing. We do not have copious numbers of consilia
from the period from 1250-1300. In this period, jurists wrote consilia for
private clients. They were paid modest amounts. Their consilia became part of
the court archives. They did not circulate. They were not collected.
The jurists were soon asked to render
opinions on delicate political matters. An early example is a consilium written
by Jacobus de Belvisio (ca. 1270-1335) and Jacobus de Butrigariis (ca.
1274-1347) who were doctors of civil law at the Law School in Bologna. Belvisio
had been an advisor to the Angevin king who ruled the Kingdom of Naples, Charles
II of Anjou († 1309). Sometime around 1309 both jurists were asked to write a
consilium about the feudal rights and obligations contained in a feudal
contract. The podestà of Castello di Monte, in the territory of San Gimignano,
had sworn a feudal oath to the representative of Charles I of Anjou, the King of
Naples (1225-1285), John Britaud, the Vicar of Tuscany. Forty years later the
jurists were asked to define the terms of the contract between the Angevin king
and the Castello and its men (universitas et homines castri Montis).
This relationship between a prince and a city is a splendid example how the
obligations of feudal law and concepts of representation in canon law melded
together in medieval society.
The two jurists began with a prologue in which they indicated their purpose. A consilium demands justice and truth. Justice means that rights should be granted to everyone. Truth means that the God guides them to seek the truth in law and in rights. The universitas and its heirs had sworn an oath of fealty and homage to the king and his heirs. The jurists saw their task as exploring what this meant in the Ius commune. To define what a vassal’s obligations were from having sworn the feudal oath they cited texts and jurisprudence from canon law.
The question remained, however, what
the obligations of a person who swore a feudal oath were if he were not a
vassal, courtier (domesticus), or familiaris regis (a special dignity at the
Angevin court) and if he were not placed under perpetual and continual
jurisdiction of the king. The feudal contract stated that the men were to
“defend and preserve royal property to the best of their ability against all
other communes (universitates) and persons.” However, the jurists did not think
that their obligations extended beyond the borders of Tuscany.
Nonetheless, the vassals were obligated to wage war against the enemies of the
king in Tuscany if the king waged war there. The jurists insisted that vassals
were not bound to the terms of the contract and do not have a duty to serve
their lord beyond reasonable jurisdictional limitations established by written
documents.
Furthermore, the “bonus dominus” must protect and preserve the rights and
property of his vassals. They concluded by stating unequivocally that the rights
in the feudal contracts could not be prescribed.
Jacobus Belvisio and de Butrigariis
used the norms and principles taken from canon, Roman, and feudal law to
interpret the feudal contract concluded forty years earlier. They repeated
several times the six key concepts for understanding a feudal contract: incolume,
tutum, honestum, utile, facile, et possibile (uninjured, safe, honest, useful,
easy, and possible). These concepts were not taken from Roman or feudal law. As
we saw in section two, they were contained in a letter of Fulbert, bishop of
Chartres († 1028), in which he had defined the obligations of the vow of fealty.
That chapter of Gratian’s Decretum had become the locus classicus for
discussions of the feudal contract. The two jurists also used corporate law to
understand the relationship between the feudal lord and his subjects. As in the
case of Castello di Monte procurators with full power (plena potestas) could
bind the universitas not only in the present but also in the future. Oaths of
fealty bound corporations as firmly as they bound persons. At the end of their
consilium the jurists noted how much they were paid for their work: eight gold
Florins.
One of the first jurists to produce a
collection of his consilia was Oldradus de Ponte. He was a professor of law and
advocate in the Roman curia in Avignon. He was born in Lodi and died sometime
after 1337, probably in Avignon. Oldradus studied law at Bologna at the end of
the thirteenth century. He was a layman, married with three sons, one of whom
became a jurist. Lay canonists were not unusual in the fourteenth century. He
entered the entourage of Cardinal Peter Colonna in 1297 for a short time, and
later he taught law at the University of Padua until ca. 1310. He left Padua for
the papal court in Avignon. Oldradus served as an auditor and judge in the Rota
(papal judicial court) at Avignon. He may have also taught in the law school at
the court in Avignon. From the evidence of his consilia (legal briefs) Oldradus
was the most important jurist at the papal court from ca. 1311-1337. An
Englishman at the curia, Thomas Fastolf, wrote that Oldradus was still
discussing cases with auditors in the Rota ca. 1337. That is the last certain
notice we have of his life. He met the Petrarch at Avignon, and the poet called
him the most famous jurist of the age.
His consilia dealt with a wide range of
political problems. Many of them do not name litigants and do not describe a
particular court case. They seem to have been written in response to legal
questions that had been posed at the papal court in Avignon. He wrote consilia
on the rights of non-Christians, Jews and Muslims. Although he thought that it
was legal to wage war against Muslim’s in Spain, he argued that when they lived
peacefully in Christian society their rights should be protected.
Oldradus’ life and consilia illustrate the position that jurists had achieved in
medieval society. Their opinions were sought and paid for. A knowledge of law
was seen as a valuable tool for analyzing and solving political problems.
A conflict that arose between the
Emperor Henry VII (1309-1313) and King Robert of Naples (1309-1343) raise a
number of complicated problems for the papal court, Oldradus de Ponte, and the
jurists. Henry demanded Robert’s support for political plans in Northern Italy.
After Robert had thwarted Henry’s plans to be crowned emperor in St. Peter’s,
the two rulers became implacable enemies.
Henry’s conception of his office was as elevated as Frederick Barbarossa’s. In a letter that he sent to the kings of Europe he declared that God had established him as the one prince to whom all men should be subject. The city of Rome was the seat of ecclesiastical and imperial power. The pope, Clement V (1305-1314) entered the fray. He demanded that Henry promise not to invade Robert’s kingdom and asked him to submit his dispute with Robert to papal arbitration. In 1312 Henry broke with Robert and issued a public denunciation of him. He accused Robert of treason and summoned him to the imperial court. He threatened that the would proceed against Robert even if the king did not appear in his court.
A number of jurists wrote tracts that
defended Henry’s actions. Others wrote tracts and consilia in support of Robert.
Clement V turned to the most distinguished jurist in his cura, Oldradus de
Ponte, and asked him to write two consilia on the legal issues of the dispute.
In the first, Oldradus dealt almost exclusively with the question of due
process. He posed a series of questions about the legitimacy of Henry's summons
of Robert to his court. Is a summons issued to a place where a defendant has
notorious enemies invalid? If so, is a subsequent trial and judgment also
invalid? Oldradus argued that two considerations must be taken into account when
examining a summons: the "execution of intent" and the manner through which the
summons is brought. The execution of intent is the defendant's knowledge of the
summons and his ability to defend himself. This element was a principle of the
Ius commune and cannot be omitted. Oldradus observed that the right of
self-defense is granted to everyone in extrajudicial matters by natural law, and
consequently, a person has the right to defend himself by natural law. There can
be no defense without knowledge. If the prince would render a judgment without
all necessary knowledge, he would take a defense away from a man that is granted
by natural law. This is also a principle of the Ius commune, concluded Oldradus,
and the prince may not violate it. A summons is the means by which knowledge is
brought to the court. The means by which a summons is delivered is not
established by natural law. A summons can be delivered by a nuncio, letter, or
edict. The means are regulated by positive law, and the prince can, therefore,
summon anyone as he wishes.
In the second consilium Oldradus grappled with the other issue raised by the dispute: did the emperor exercise jurisdiction over other kings and over the king of Sicily? He drew his arguments from many sources and decisively rejected the emperor's claim that he was “dominus mundi.” The Roman people could not have bestowed more power on the emperor than they themselves held. They did not exercise authority over other nations, therefore they could not make him lord of the world. God did not establish imperial rule since there were no scriptural justifications for it. He cited a metaphor of the bees that imperialists had used to justify the emperor’s authority. “One bee who is king,” he wrote, “is not king of all bees.”
One feature of Oldradus's consilium is particularly striking: he did not deny the universality of the emperor by subjecting him to the pope. Oldradus was no hierocrat. His comment at the end of the consilium is telling. After reviewing the arguments of the canonists for the emperor's sovereignty, he concluded that their thought was a result of their nationalities: Johannes Teutonicus was a German, the others were Italians, therefore, as subjects of the emperor, they supported his claims of sovereignty. Only the Spanish opposed German claims. Oldradus's consilium became a focal point for considering the universal authority of the emperor in the later Middle Ages. Jurists and publicists incorporated it into their works, and supporters of the late medieval empire combated its thesis.
In these consilia Oldradus put forward two arguments to justify Robert of Naples's position. The first was new and had slowly evolved in the thought of the jurists during the previous fifty years. The prince could not deny a subject his right of due process when this right was grounded in natural law. The second argument was not as new and had been debated for two centuries. Oldradus maintained that the emperor was not “dominus mundi” and did not exercise jurisdiction outside the borders of the German empire.
Oldradus’ consilia marked a new stage in the role of jurists in politics. In earlier political disputes the opinions of the jurists were ephemeral documents written for a particular dispute, at a particular time, in a particular place. Oldradus’ consilia, however, were included in his collection of consilia. They circulated widely in manuscript form. With the advent of printing they circulated even more universally. His consilia were reprinted numerous times in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Oldradus’ and the jurists’ consilia were transformed from temporally limited legal arguments on particular cases to general political statements about the right order of medieval political institutions. They articulated the political principles developed by the jurists of the Ius commune and provided concrete examples of how these norms could be applied. Jurists read and cited Oldradus’ consilia for the next three centuries. Consilia became one of the main vehicles for the circulation of the political principles of the Ius commune.
After Oldradus every major jurist who wrote consilia had his collected and published. The great majority of them were devoted to the mundane affairs of everyday life: wills, doweries, contracts, and marriage cases. Jurists wrote consilia for individuals, corporations, and princes. When the jurists wrote consilia about the institutions of medieval society they often provide insights into the political life of communities that no other sources offer.
Bartolus of Sassoferrato (ca. 1313-1357) was one of the most revered jurists in Italy during the fourteenth century. His fame has endured until the present day. His career as a teacher and jurist was at the dawn of the Age of Consilia. Consequently he produced ca. 400 consilia, which is much less than the large numbers of consilia that later jurists wrote. Although most of his consilia did not treat political problems, one that does offers an example of his political thought.
In ca. 1258 the commune of Spoleto
granted some inhabitants of Arrone a place that came to be called Montefranco.
The commune granted these men and their heirs their liberty and a privileged
legal status as free men (libertas et franchisia). They would have the same
liberties as the citizens of Spoleto. In return the men promised the commune to
build a fortification and to render annual services. These services probably
included the defense of Spoleto. Montefranco was on a hill 400 meters high and
was a splendid position to defend Spoleto from the South. The men of Montefranco
lived there for forty years and never paid taxes to Spoleto. In the 1330's
Montefranco and other fortified towns surrounding Spoleto resisted the commune’s
attempts to integrate them into the political life of the commune. In particular
they resisted paying taxes. Montefranco asked Bartolus to write a consilia that
was probably presented in the communal court of Spoleto. Bartolus posed two
questions: Could Spoleto impose taxes on Montefranco and would their immunity
from taxation extend to goods that they had acquired?
Bartolus first broached the question of citizenship: were the men of Montefranco citizens of Spoleto or inhabitants of the city? If Montefranco were part of the territory of Spoleto Bartolus had no doubt that any person who was born there was a citizen of the commune. Bartolus put forward the arugment that the commune granted the men of Montefranco the right to build a fortification. When Spoleto concluded that pact the commune also bestowed all rights of lordship and jurisdiction on Montefranco. Therefore Montefranco was no longer a part of the territory of Spoleto. However, the jurist then noted that this argument was not valid because it was a principle of the Ius commune that no one could alienate lordship and jurisdiction unless it was returned to a higher authority from whom they received it. Bartolus finished this part of his consilia by stating that Montefranco is part of the territory of Spoleto, but not simply a part. Spoleto’s jurisdiction was limited by contracts, conditions, and privileges (immunitates) that were given to the men who established Montefranco.
What are the people of Montefranco
obligated to? Bartolus quoted from the original agreement: They must serve in
the army, take part in the parliament, “hold a friend for a friend,”
receive a podestà, and pay a certain amount annually. The original inhabitants
of Montefranco promised that and no more. Bartolus cinched his argument with a
norm from testamentary law: “those things that one wants to be bound by makes
clear that in other things one does not want to be obligated.” Since the men of
Montefranco did not obligate themselves to pay taxes, Spoleto cannot impose
taxes on them. Bartolus noted that even though Spoleto promised to treat them as
citizens one may not conclude that they had the authority to impose taxes on
them as if they were citizens.
Bartolus concluded by noting that when Spoleto promised to grant the men of
Montefranco the same liberty and franchise as the citizens of Spoleto, the
commune cannot now claim that they are obligated to more than what was contained
in their contract. “It is certain,” Bartolus asserted, “that the men of
Montefranco believe with just reason that they are free from the burden of
paying taxes. They have not paid taxes for forty years and more. They are free
and cannot have new taxes imposed upon them.”
When Bartolus turned to the issue of
whether the commune could tax the property acquired since the contract had been
made, he turned to the jurisprudence of canon law. The canonists had argued that
papal privileges that exempted monasteries from tithes could be interpreted as
exempting future property from tithes.
Bartolus applied the same norms and cited the same papal decretals to argue that
the new property of the men of Montefranco was also exempt. “The men of
Montefranco are exempt, their heirs are exempt, the heirs of their heirs are
exempt to infinity,” trumpeted Bartolus at the end of the consilium.
Bartolus’ consilium illustrates interplay of institutions and rights in medieval society. The jurists mediated and controlled relationships in society by bringing their knowledge and expertise to bear on political questions. The norms of the Ius commune provided them with the tools to analyze political problems. Their status as respected and valued experts made their opinions important in European courts and also in the schools. The case law in the Ius commune had been confined to the appellate decisions of the popes in canonical collections. By the end of the fourteenth century the proliferation of consilia provided secular and ecclesiastical courts with authoritative statements of law that were cited in the courts and pondered in the schools.
Baldus
de Ubaldis (1327-1400) succeeded Bartolus as the most renowned European jurist.
Baldus taught at the law schools of Perugia, Florence, and Padua. He began
teaching at the university of Pavia in 1390. The powerful ruler of Milan,
Giangaleazzo Visconti, had appointed him to the post, and he remained there
until his death in 1400. When Giangaleazzo summoned him, he was the most
distinguished Italian jurist of his time, and his fame had begun to rival that
of his old teacher in Perugia, Bartolus.
Baldus wrote several thousand consilia,
many of which have never been printed. After arriving in Pavia, he rendered
several important political opinions for his new lord. Legal historians have
long known of these consilia that Baldus composed for Giangaleazzo. In his
sixteenth-century biography of Baldus, Diplovatatius mentioned consilia
touching upon Giangaleazzo's affairs. In one of these consilia, “Rex Romanorum,”
Baldus discussed the legal questions revolving around Giangaleazzo's assumption
of ducal authority in Lombardy. Baldus struggled with, and slowly began to
resolve, the issues that touched fundamental legal prerogatives of the
Visconti's signoría. “Rex Romanorum” offers us a rare glimpse of how a
medieval jurist wrote, and then rewrote, a consilium treating a delicate
political and legal problem.
Baldus began to write “Rex Romanorum” in response to the objections of some Italians to the German Emperor Wenceslaus's bestowal of Lombardy on Giangaleazzo as general imperial vicar in 1395. With his privilege in hand, Giangaleazzo claimed a ducal title for himself and argued that all cities and lordships were now subject to him as their feudal lord. Wenceslaus had granted Giangaleazzo all imperial rights and lordships in Lombardy. He declared that he made this grant with certain knowledge and from his fullness of power, notwithstanding any concessions, constitutions, immunities, liberties, and privileges that anyone might possess.
The privilege raised several legal problems. It encroached upon the rights of imperial vassals in Lombardy and broke longstanding diplomatic ties between the emperor and local authorities. Some German princes claimed that the emperor did not have the authority to grant such a privilege because it injured the imperial patrimony.
Baldus raised two questions in the beginning of the first version of “Rex Romanorum”. In the first, he asked whether a nobleman, who held a city not mentioned in the privilege, but whose city contained a part of a diocesis that Wenceslaus had bestowed upon Giangaleazzo, must acknowledge Giangaleazzo's lordship. The second question was whether Wenceslaus had granted all jurisdiction and power to Giangaleazzo and whether he could recognize who was or who was not an imperial vassal according to his will.
In fact, if we may judge from the space that he allotted to each question, the second was of far greater importance to Baldus. He devoted only a few lines to the first question. In his earliest draft of the consilium, he concentrated on whether Wenceslaus could transfer all imperial jurisdiction and power to Giangaleazzo. If Giangaleazzo had seen this early version of the consilium, he might not have been pleased. Baldus restricted Wenceslaus's privilege considerably. Could the emperor order a vassal who holds him as his liege lord to swear allegiance to another lord? Baldus concluded that it would be dangerous to believe the emperor had this authority. Further, if one thought that Wenceslaus could revoke earlier privileges, then his successor might do exactly the same. Giangaleazzo and his children might lose everything that Wenceslaus had granted them. Echoing the constitutional provisions of Magna Carta, he noted that if a feudal lord wronged his vassal, he should appeal to his peers at the lord's court. If this failed, he could wage war against his lord.
Baldus concluded his argument with a hope and a proverb. His hope was one that he would repeat several times later on in the consilium: that Giangaleazzo would listen to opinions that might not please him. In his proverb, Baldus quoted a King who wished that he would not bestow a larger but a more stable kingdom upon his son. Baldus's message to Giangaleazzo was clear: treat the rights of imperial vassals in Lombardy with respect.
After discussing these issues, Baldus ended the first draft of the consilium with a remark that seems an afterthought: all this is true if one presupposes that the emperor-elect can bestow such a privilege.
In the next stage of composition,
Baldus wrote tackled other problems connected with Giangaleazzo’s ducal rights.
In his first analysis, Baldus dealt with the emperor's authority to derogate or
abrogate legislation: could the emperor abrogate or derogate imperial privileges
that his predecessors had bestowed upon the princes of Lombardy? Since then he
read consilia of Christophorus and Paulus de Artionibus
in
which they argued that the pope could neither revoke a fief nor change its terms
to a vassal's detriment. These two consilia raised an issue that Baldus had not
considered. When Wenceslaus had granted Giangaleazzo lordship over Lombardy, he
broke his feudal contracts with his Lombard vassals. The jurists who commented
on feudal law had developed a very sophisticated theory of how contracts bound
the prince. By the end of the thirteenth century, most jurists agreed that the
prince could not unilaterally break a contract with his vassal. Baldus sat down
and added a short treatise on contracts. He argued that feudal contracts could
only be changed with the consent of the parties. A contract with the prince
could not be valid if its force were dependent on his will alone. The prince is
a rational creature and ought to be subject to reason. He should not break
contracts without cause. In doubtful matters, one should never assume that the
prince wishes to dispossess someone of their rights.
Baldus then continued the discussion of whether a prince could transfer an unwilling vassal to another lord. Drawing analogous examples from marriage, slave, and contract law, he argued both sides of the issue. In his conclusion, he did not resolve the issue but raised an entirely different question: did Wenceslaus diminish imperial authority by granting his privilege? To this question, Baldus could give a confident, if somewhat irrelevant answer: No.
Baldus turned next to feudal oaths. Vassals in Giangaleazzo's lands are obligated to render the feudal oath to him, but if they refuse, they should lose only their fiefs and should not be punished further. In the end, however, Baldus again affirmed his position that the prince should not force an unwilling vassal to accept a new lord and made a plea that Giangaleazzo should understand that any right he wished to exercise must be based on equity. If not, it was unjust.
Baldus made another important addition to the first part of the consilium at the very end. A contract, he wrote, was different from a privilege. The prince is bound to observe a contract by natural law, and this is one case in which the prince is not presumed to have acted with cause. In his earlier statement on contracts, Baldus had not treated this issue of cause — a key element in the jurists' theory of contracts — nor had he based his argument on natural law. Now, however, he formulated a general statement on the inviolability of contracts with which almost every jurist between 1200 and 1700 might have agreed.
In this consilium Baldus touched upon
almost every element of the jurists’ ideas of princely authority.
The task was not an easy one
for him. Although he had treated many of the questions separately in his
commentaries on the Corpus iuris civilis and his commentaries on canon
and feudal law, when asked to analyze Giangaleazzo's rather straightforward
problem, he did not find it easy to bring what he had written about the emperor
together. Naturally, he was sensitive to the political dangers of giving
Giangaleazzo an unsatisfactory answer. But, he had lived for most of his life in
republican city states, and their constitutional problems undoubtedly attracted
his attention more than those of the prince. He had written other
consilia that touched upon the political problems in Europe, most notably on the
Papal Schism of 1378.
His consilia treating the rights of Giangaleazzo and the Papal Schism underlines
a fundamental point about the literary genre. The jurists were forced to
synthesize the rich, fecund, and complex traditions of the Ius commune when they
treated a complicated political case. This task was something that they never
faced in their great commentaries, but it was a task that played an important
role in shaping European political thought.
At the end of the Middle Ages the Age
of Consilia was in full swing. Most jurists produced few works of commentary but
many consilia. By the end of the fifteenth century it was the most important
genre in law. Great political events were often subjected to minute analysis in
consilia commissioned by princes. The
dramatic events surrounding the murder of Giuliano de’ Medici compelled the
supporters of the Medici to commission a number of jurists to write consilia on
the issues of the case. The protagonists in Giuliano’s murder were worthy foes.
On the one side stood the pope, Sixtus IV, the spiritual leader of Christendom
and temporal prince of Central Italy; on the other, Lorenzo, first citizen of
Florence.
Sixtus had excommunicated Lorenzo after he had escaped the assassins whom the pope had probably hired. Lorenzo had no doubts about the injustice of pope’s duplicity. On 19 June 1478, he wrote to René of Anjou:
I know that the only crime I have committed against the pope is, and God is my witness, that I live and that I did not suffer death . . . On our side we have canon law, on our side we have natural and political law, on our side we have truth and innocence, on our side God and mankind.
Sixtus’s bull of 1 June, 1478 had condemned Lorenzo as a son of iniquity and a rebel against the Church. Sixtus used the new printing press to give his bull the wide circulation. The Signoria of Florence responded to Sixtus’s letter on 21 July, in an apologia probably written by Bartolomeo Scala. They rejected Sixtus’ allegation that Lorenzo was a tyrant. The pope had the authority, they observed, to wage war against the Turks, but to wage war against a Christian ruler was quite another matter. Both Sixtus’ original bull and the Signoria’s response to it were pieces of propaganda aimed at a larger public.
Lorenzo and his advisors must have been aware that they needed more than propaganda to discredit Sixtus’ excommunication and interdict, and a number of jurists were called upon to defend Lorenzo. They quickly responded with detailed rebuttals and provided Lorenzo with a formidable defense. By the end of July, 1478 he had already received tightly argued and lengthy consilia.
Four consilia have been preserved from this controversy. Each consilium contains extensive discussions of the political and the legal ramifications of the Pazzi Conspiracy. Bartolomeo Sozzini (Socinus) (1436-1507), the doctors of Florence who represented the entire college of doctors (undoubtedly the doctors of law), Francesco Accolti, and lastly, Girolamo Torti (Hieronimus de Tortis) all wrote consilia defending the Medici.
When Lorenzo wrote to René of Anjou in the middle of June, he must have known about the main arguments that could be made in his defense. The rhetorical flourish of his elegantly cadenced litany --- that canon law, natural law, and God supported him --- should not obscure the essential truth of his statement. All the consilia make the same argument: two centuries of Romano-canonical procedural law supported Lorenzo, and these procedural rules were not just a part of positive canon law but were based on a higher law, natural law. Each jurist made the same fundamental point: even the prince’s (in this case the pope’s) “potestas absoluta” could not subvert the judicial process. They established that when Sixtus condemned Lorenzo, he had violated procedural rules to which even the pope must adhere. There was no longer any doubt that the supreme prince of Christendom was bound by the procedural rules of the Ius commune.
The jurists’ defense of Lorenzo de’ Medici provides remarkable illustration of the political role that the jurists played in medieval society. By the end of the fifteenth century, Lorenzo’s dramatic rhetoric in his letter to René of Anjou was more than just rhetoric. Law was staunchly on his side. Jurists inside and outside Florence leant their legal expertise to his defense. In their consilia, the lawyers summarized two centuries of juristic thought about the relationship of the prince and the law. Their task was not daunting. The commentaries of the jurists had created a sophisticated doctrine of “due process” that Pope Sixtus violated when he condemned Lorenzo without a hearing. A defendant’s right to present his case in court had become so embedded in juristic thought that even the prince’s absolute power could not dislodge it.
The writings of these jurists transmitted the jurisprudence of due process into the early modern period. Due process of law became part of the intellectual baggage of every jurist who studied the Ius commune, and natural law continued to be the sturdy foundations upon which key elements of judicial procedure rested. Bartolomé de Las Casas, Jean Bodin, Samuel Pufendorf, Johannes Althusius, and Benedict Carpzov incorporated these norms of procedure created by the medieval jurists into their works.
The Renaissance is not a meaningful
concept in the history of law and jurisprudence nor in the history of political
thought.
The jurists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries dealt with the same
problems, used the same texts, were shaped by the same norms and jurisprudence
as the jurists of the fourteenth and fifteenth century. The jurisprudence of the
Ius commune was too potent and intellectual construct to be significantly
distorted or completely dismantled by developments in philology and religion.
Recent scholarship has demonstrated that the Protestant Reformation had only a
modest impact on law. In his fine study of Lutheran jurisprudence in the
sixteenth century, John Witte Jr. concluded that:
It must be emphasized that there were dozens of other Evangelical moralists and jurists <besides Melanchthon, Eisermann and Oldendorp> in the first half of the sixteenth century who wrote on law, politics, and society. Sometimes their views echoed those of Melanchthon, Eisermann, or Oldendorp. Sometimes, they adhered more closely to the traditional teachings of medieval canonists and civilians. The Lutheran Reformation did not produce a single or uniform jurisprudence.
Witte has
shown that the Protestant jurists’ conception of politics was virtually the same
as their predecessors. They believed that magistrates must obey their own laws.
Natural law limited their authority and power. The Ius commune was the font of
legal reason (Witte illustrates this very well in his discussion of their
conception of equity). Protestant jurists adopted a key element of prior
political thought and incorporated it fully into their work: the common good.
The same may be said of the great
jurists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Northern jurists who
practiced what has been called the “mos gallicus” used the tools of philology to
recover the texts of Roman law. They used the same tools that Erasmus used to
study the Bible and that Lorenzo Valla and others employed to produce texts that
were cleansed of detritus of centuries. Some scholars have contrasted this
“Humanistic Jurisprudence” with the “mos italicus.” In Italy, they generalized,
law remained trapped in the grip of medieval jurists. These generalizations have
a grain of truth but obscure several important points. When they wrote about
political power the humanists discussed many of the same issues in exactly the
same language as their medieval and Italian colleagues. They depended on the
same set of norms embedded in the Ius commune. The practicioners of the “mos
gallicus” were just as interested in the practice of law and in the foundation
of political life in law as their southern counterparts. They were not scholars
who distanced themselves from the real world. Perhaps the most significant
difference between these jurists (North and South of the Alps) and their
predecessors was their interest in systematically exploring subjects. Jean
Bodin’s De republica, Prospero Farinacci’s Praxis et theoricae
criminalis, and Hugo Grotius’ and Samuel Pufendorf’s works all illustrate a
commitment to creating comprehensive surveys that treated certain aspects of
law.
Not all or even the most important
humanist jurists produced systematic treatments of political thought. Perhaps
the most important French jurist of the sixteenth century, Jacques Cujas (Cujacius)
(1522-1590) scattered his remarks about the authority of the prince, the
structure of society, and the sources of law throughout his works in good
medieval fashion. His most important conclusions about the prince and the state
echo the thought of the medieval jurists. Reason and the common good are the
foundation stones upon which society rests.
There can be no people without law, and the people must consent to the law for
it to be valid.
He concluded, in traditional fashion, that the prince is bound by the laws.
A medieval jurist would have found nothing strange in his conclusions or in his
reasoning. His political thought may have been cloaked in the refined language
of the humanists but his conclusions were resonant with older discourses.
Indeed, during the sixteenth century, jurists described the authority of the prince with the same terminology that their predecessors had used since the thirteenth. The prince had “plenitudo potestatis,” “potestas absoluta” — “ordinata,” and was “legibus solutus.” Historians cannot, however, agree whether the jurists in the sixteenth century changed the meanings of these terms. A key issue that has sparked much debate is whether medieval jurists attributed “true” sovereignty to the prince and whether sixteenth-century jurists interpreted these terms as granting the prince absolute power, untrammeled by any limitations. Did absolutism replace medieval constitutionalism?
It is beyond the scope of this essay to solve this problem. We have seen that medieval jurists interpreted the authority of the prince in a variety of ways --- from what might be described as “constitutional” to “absolutistic.” A brief comparison of medieval and early modern definitions of absolute power might illustrate the range of meanings that absolute power had in the writings of the late medieval and early modern jurists.
The great Italian, Protestant jurist
turned Englishman, Albericus Gentilis, wrote a tract in 1605 in which he
discussed the nature of monarchy.
He observed that royal power is absolute, that is without limits. The prince is
“legibus solutus,” and what pleases the prince has the force of law, for his
will is held to be reason.
No medieval jurist would have quarreled with Albericus. However, he continued in
a different vein: “And they define absolute power as that through which he can
take away a right of another, even a great right, without cause.”
Most of his predecessors would have parted company with him at this point. The
jurists of the Ius commune were not, for the most part, absolutists.
Sixteenth-century political thought has
a rich variety and texture. William Barclay, a Scotsman, studied law on the
continent and subsequently became a professor of Roman law at Pont-à-Mousson and
Angers. His most significant work of political theory was De regno et regali
potestate.
Although some scholars have called him an absolutist and staunch proponent of
divine right monarchy, if one reads him carefully, his language and thought is
simply a statement of the Roman law principle “princeps legibus solutus est,” —
the prince may transcend positive law through his absolute power — and he
borrows extensively — often with direct quotes — from the glosses of the
canonists. He did not depart significantly from the norms of “medieval
constitutionalism.”
Perhaps the best-known commentary on a
ruler's authority and power in the sixteenth century is Jean Bodin’s De
republica.
Some scholars have summarized sovereignty in Bodin's De
republica as “high, absolute, and perpetual power over citizens.”
The prince “gives laws to all his subjects” without seeking anyone's or any
group's consent. Bodin's prince was absolute “and even if his commands are never
‘just or honest,’ it is still ‘not lawful for the subject to break the laws of
his prince’.”
If they are right, Bodin seems to have broken sharply with traditional
definitions of political power, and his prince was absolute as few others before
him were.
Bodin created an exalted and rarified vision of political power, but in his prefatory letter he denied that his De republica broke with the past. He discussed the prince’s authority in Book one, chapter eight of the De republica and adopted the terminology of power that the jurists had created in the jurisprudence of the Ius commune. “Maiestas,” he wrote, cannot be limited by time, by a greater power, nor by any law. “Maiestas” meant that the prince was not bound by the law. In other words, Bodin equated “maiestas” with the prince's absolute power to change, abrogate or derogate positive law. He explained that the kings of France were loosed from the law and possessed absolute power. As a justification of his contention, he cited a famous consilium Oldradus de Ponte in which Oldradus had equated kings with the emperor and insisted that European kings were not subject to imperial jurisdiction. Bodin defined absolute power with language that is redolent with echoes of the past:
What is absolute power, or rather power that has been freed from the law? No one has yet defined it. If we define absolute power as that which is above all laws, then no prince possesses the rights of sovereignty. All princes are bound by divine, natural, and the common law of all nations [Quid autem sit absoluta, vel potius soluta lege potestas, nemo definiit. Nam si legibus omnibus solutam definiamus, nullus omnino princeps iura maiestatis habere comperiatur, cum omnes teneat lex divina, lex item naturae, tum etiam lex omnium gentium communis, quae a naturae legibus ac divinis divisas habet rationes].
Any late medieval jurist could have written this definition of political authority. Natural law had traditionally limited the prince.
Medieval and early modern jurists always used natural law and the norms of the Ius commune to limit the prince. They also used amorphous concept that they called “status regni” or, in the church, “status ecclesiae.” The state of the realm or the state of the church was an inviolable body of law, custom, and tradition that was not subject to the authority of the prince. Bodin declared that all laws from which the prince derives his “imperium” cannot be arrogated or derogated. An example, he noted, was the Salic law from which French kings derived their authority and which was the very foundation of the kingdom. Assemblies of the people, he argued, could not limit the prince’s sovereignty.
Natural law was the kernel of medieval
jurisprudence that blossomed into a coherent intellectual system harnessing the
will of the prince.
Bodin adopted all the limitations of the prince's sovereignty that the jurists
had developed during the prior three centuries:
Those who state that princes are loosed from laws and contracts give great injury to immortal God and nature, unless they except the laws of God and of nature, as well as property and rights protected by just contracts with private persons [Qui autem principes, legibus et pactis conventis solutos esse statuunt, nisi Dei praepotentis ac naturae leges, tum etiam res ac rationes cum privatis iusta conventione contractas excipiant, maximam immortali Deo, ac naturae iniuriam inferunt].
To support
his allegation, he cited Accursius's famous gloss to Princeps [Dig.
1.3.31(30)] in a marginal footnote, reaching back three centuries for an
authority to define princely power. As Brian Tierney brilliantly demonstrated
when he dissected Accursius's gloss thirty years ago, although modern historians
have misread him, Bodin would have understood Accursius's references and
allusions as no modern reader can.
Accursius held contracts to be inviolable and secure from the arbitrary power of
the prince. His commentary on Princeps is an extended discourse on the
prince's obligation to submit himself to positive law. Bodin reached back into
Accursius’ Ordinary Gloss on Justinian’s Digest and adopted his
thirteenth-century principles.
Medieval and early modern jurists distinguished between contracts that the prince made with private citizens and those he concluded with other princes or cities. They also noted that contracts between citizens and non-citizens had a different legal status. Bodin did not use these distinctions to augment princely authority by arguing that the prince could render some contracts invalid but not others. The prince could not break any contract he entered into; he was bound to uphold the law. He cited a recent event in French history to support his contention. The French parlement had vigorously maintained that Charles IX could not sunder his agreements with the clergy without their consent. Bodin rejected the views of those canonists like Panormitanus, Antonio de Butrio, Francesco Zabarella, and Felinus who had argued that the prince's contracts were “natural obligations” and only validated by civil law. Although Bodin may not have understood his predecessors’ thought on contracts accurately, he vigorously rejected any attempt to enhance the authority of the prince to break contracts arbitrarily. Who can doubt, he asked rhetorically, that obligations and contracts have the same nature?
In the preceding pages we have discussed the intricate development of juristic ideas about a just trial and fair legal procedures — what in Anglo-American common law is called due process of the law. We have noted that when earlier jurists discussed due process, they invariably raised the issue whether the prince could subvert judicial procedure through his absolute power or “plenitudo potestatis.” We have also seen that early modern jurists embraced medieval conceptions of due process. When we turn to Bodin's Republic, we find no discussion of due process or the prince's role in the judicial process. The explanation for this omission is simple. Bodin limited his prince much more than any medieval jurist would have thought possible: he barred him from the courtroom. Medieval jurists had understood that when the prince presided over a court, he violated basic legal principles that forbade a judge to participate in cases that touched his own interests. In Book 4, Chapter 6 of the Republic, Bodin proves that the prince should not serve as a judge in his kingdom. In contrast to his discussion of the prince's absolute power in Book 1, Chapter 8, he cited very few legal citations and gave only a few references to earlier jurists. His reticence is not inexplicable. No earlier jurists had ever argued that the prince could not preside over his own court. The key question is whether Bodin would have adopted the principles of due process that we have discussed, even if he banned the prince from the courtroom. He referred to judicial procedure in one brief, but telling passage:
Therefore, if a contract is natural and common to all nations, then obligations and actions have the same nature. No contract and obligation can be conceived that is not common to nature and all nations [Igitur si conventio naturalis est ac gentium omnium communis, obligationes quoque et actiones, eiusdem esse naturae, consequens est. At nulla fere conventio, nulla obligatio cogitari potest, quae non sit et naturae et gentium omnium communis].
Bodin cited three texts of Roman law to justify his statement. One of them, Ex hoc iure, was the key passage in the Digest that discussed the origins of judicial procedure.
Bodin's theory of contracts is one of the keys to understanding his relationship to past jurisprudence. He noted that although some contracts might arise from the positive laws of a city, the prince would still be obligated to observe those agreements even more than a private person. Furthermore, the prince cannot abrogate pacts even with his most exalted power. All the most important jurists, observed Bodin, agreed on this point.
Like many other late medieval jurists, Bodin considered Angelus de Ubaldis a prime example of those jurists who granted the pope, emperor, and kings inordinate, unrestrained power. Angelus's opinion was not as straightforward as his interpreters imagined, but Bodin dubbed him one of those “pernicious adulators” of the prince's power. Nonetheless, he noted that most jurists — citing Cinus, Panormitanus, Baldus, Bartolus, and others — believed that the prince could not arbitrarily expropriate the goods of private citizens. Bodin concurred. Bodin delivered a ringing condemnation of absolute power as an arbitrary and tyrannical authority in De republica :
Since the jurists abhor that plague and dispute many things of that sort brilliantly, nevertheless they make an absurd exception. They say that if the prince wishes to use his highest, absolute power, that <he may expropriate private property> as if they would say that it is in accordance with divine law to dispossess citizens with force and arms. The Germans call the right of the powerful to despoil the weak the law of pillage. Pope Innocent IV, who was an extraordinarily learned jurist, defined this power as the authority to derogate ordinary law. They claim that this great power of the prince can abrogate divine and natural law ["Sed cum pestem illam abhorreant, ac multa in eo genere praeclare disputent; illud tamen absurde, quod hanc exceptionem subiiciunt, nisi summa, et ut ipsi loquuntur, absoluta potestate uti velit, quod perinde est, acsi dicerent, vi et armis oppressos cives diripere fas esse. Potentiores enim hoc iure adversus inopiam tenuiorem uti consueverunt, quod praedatorium ius rectissime appellant Germani. At Innocentius iiii. pontifex Romanus, iuris utriusque peritissimus, summam illam, sine legibus, solutam potestatem definiit, ordinario iuri derogare posse. Illi vero summam potestatem ad legum divinarum ac naturalium abrogationem pertinere voluerunt]..
Bodin did not embrace (what he thought was) Innocent IV's absolutism. He accepted the commonly held limitations on the prince's absolute power and rejected Angelus de Ubaldis and others who granted the prince great power to subvert the established order. Bodin concluded, just as so many of his predecessors had also concluded, that the prince could not expropriate property without a just cause.
Bodin raised the question whether the prince was bound by the contracts of his predecessors. The jurists had discussed this issue in connection with the Donation of Constantine and had generally agreed that the prince was bound to observe the contractual and testamentary provisions of his predecessors. Bodin pointed out that the prince's hereditary obligations must be upheld. Why must we discuss this distinction, he asked, since wills and contracts are a part of the law of nations? For Bodin the answer was simple. The law of nations is not inviolable, unless it is also supported by divine and natural law. The prince may revoke iniquitous laws even if they are part of the law of nations — such as the law of slavery.
What should be clear by this point is that Bodin's conception of sovereignty was unthinkable without the work of his predecessors. His definition of absolute power was taken from earlier jurists, and the limitations that he placed upon the prince were adopted from their thought. His argument that contracts, private property, and actions were based on natural and divine law were items that he easily took from the shelves of medieval jurisprudence. He did not cite the opinions of medieval and Renaissance jurists arbitrarily or willfully, but he knew their thought and their idiosyncracies well. We may conclude that Bodin's conception of sovereignty that he expounded in Book 1, chapter 8 of the De republica would not have offended the most constitutionally minded jurist of the Middle Ages.
Bodin's contribution to the history of
political thought was conceptual rather than substantive. The medieval and
Renaissance jurists rarely wrote systematically about sovereignty. When they
referred to the loci classici of the prince's authority, the glosses and
commentaries on these texts did expound a coherent doctrine. But not a coherent
work which could be entitled “On sovereignty.” They were content to paste their
glosses together in their minds rather than writing an extended commentary on
the Prince's maiestas. In this sense, Bodin was right when he wrote that
no one had ever defined the prince's power — no one had written a systematic
tract describing sovereignty. That was Bodin's contribution to political
thought. And it is an example of the importance of sixteenth- and
seventeenth-century jurists. In the next century, Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and
Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694) would develop and refine the genre of the legal
treatise with numerous tracts on war, peace and politics.
Even a casual reading of their work reveals there deep and profound debt to the
jurisprudence of the Ius commune. When Grotius, a Protestant, wished to define
the “supreme power” that ruled society he quoted Pope Innocent IV’s
Commentary on the Decretales of Gregory IX (just like Jean Bodin) and cited
three legal maxims that he took from the Ius commune to illustrate how the
prince’s authority was limited by legal norms.
The age of the Ius commune was waning, but its demise had not yet taken place.
It would be another century before the rise of national legal systems, the
balkanization of legal education, and the triumph of the vernacular languages
over Latin in these systems would transform a decline into a death rattle.
To end where this essay began: with Johannes Althusius. When Althusius defined politics as the “art of associating (consociandi) men for the purpose of establishing, cultivating, and conserving social life among them,” described the task that the jurists of the Ius commune had accomplished in the prior four centuries. They used a dead legal system (Roman law), canon law, and feudal law to define and measure the political bonds in European society. Many of the norms that they created still shape our political thought and thinking today.